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They talked of the past, really -always about the past. Even the future
seemed like something gone and done with when they spoke of it. It did
not seem an extension of their past, but a repetition of it. They would
agree that nothing remained of life as they had known it, the world was
changing swiftly, but by the mysterious logic of hope they insisted that
each change was probably the last; or if not, a series of changes might

*Professor of Law and Julius E. Davis Chair in Law, 2000-2001, University of
Minnesota Law School <chenx064@maroon.tc.umn.edu>. Daniel A. Farber, David
McGowan, Gil Grantmore, and Jon K. Lauck supplied helpful comments. Nicole A.
Saharsky provided very capable research assistance. Special thanks to Kathleen
Howard.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vo1.10:1

bring them, blessedly, back full-circle to the old ways they had known.
Who knows why they loved their past? It had been bitterfor them ....
they had questioned the burdensome rule they lived by every day of
their lives, but without rebellion and without expecting an answer.

Anne Porter, The Old Order1

-Katherine

I.
A.

LOSERS IN THE LIMELIGHT

NATURE OVER NURTURE, LEISURE OVER LABOR

2
A specter is haunting academia, the specter of globalization.
In Globalizationand Its Losers,3 an essay published in the winter
2000 issue of the Minnesota Journalof Global Trade, I described
legal and economic integration across borders as an epochal
moment for a broad array of ecological, cultural, and economic
interests. The summer 2000 issue of this journal published replies
by two historians, an agricultural ethicist, and an advocate of
regional self-reliance. At their mildest, my critics accused me of
misusing Darwinian metaphors and of misconstruing the
agricultural stake in international economic disputes. At their
most vehement, my critics accused me of arrogance, intolerance,
and even totalitarian proclivities.
Because this debate has now spanned three issues of this
journal, I shall restate my own position as well as those of my
critics. Globalization and Its Losers rested on simple premises but
reached tough normative conclusions. Globalization increases
total wealth. Like any other change in the terms and conditions of
economic interaction, however, globalization has also shifted
wealth and political power. There are, in short, winners and
losers. Moreover, globalization often pits environmental, cultural,
and labor interests not only against the international legal norm
of free trade, but also against each other.
In a passage that evidently offended at least one critic's
aesthetic sensibilities, 4 I summarized my prescription for
resolving conflicts sparked by free trade and globalization.

Counseling "enormous reverence for genes. .. , measured respect
1. KATHERINE ANNE PORTER, The Old Order, in THE OLD ORDER: STORIES OF
THE SOUTH 11, 13-14 (1988).
2. Cf Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in THE
MARX-ENGELS READER 469, 473 (Robert C. Tucker 2d ed. 1978) [hereinafter
Communist Manifesto].
3. Jim Chen, Globalizationand Its Losers, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 157 (2000).
4. See infra note 57 and accompanying text.
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for memes, and little to no regard for jobs,"5 I concluded:
Behold then the unholy trinity of international trade law, the three
remaining lines of argument by which trade liberalization can be
derailed. Now abide labor,
culture, and ecology, these three. And the
6
least of these is labor.

I am pleased to clarify my views, but I shall not retreat
from them. I unequivocally defend the primacy of free trade as
the bedrock principle of international economic law. I also
acknowledge the existence and propriety of legal exceptions
devised to protect the environment, culture and morality, and
certain rights of laborers vis-et-vis employers. Tougher questions
arise when the three exceptions to the free trade norm environment, culture, and labor - conflict with each other. My
critics and I dispute the value judgments that such conflicts
demand. We disagree on how international law should respond, if
at all, to economic, environmental, and social dislocations effected
by globalization.
My solution can be summarized aphoristically: nature over
nurture, leisure over labor. First, in privileging environmental
claims over cultural claims, I unapologetically assign priority to
nature over nurture. Within the cultural realm, I favor the
preservation of threatened languages, which are after all the most
striking expressions of Homo sapiens' genetic endowment, over
claims based on less precise (and therefore more politically
malleable) definitions of culture. Moreover, in preferring cultural
concerns over the well-being of incumbent workers, I elevate the
fruits of human leisure over the fruits of human labor. In so doing,
I invoke the longstanding strain of Western intellectualism, from
Aristotle to contemporary evolutionary psychology, that recognizes
the primacy of leisure over labor.' I freely admit that combining
5.
6.
7.
Butcher

Chen, supra note 3, at 217.
Id.
Compare Francis Fergusson, Introduction,in ARISTOTLE'S POETICS 1, 32 (S.H.
trans., 1961) ("[Aristotle] accepted ... the Greek notion that the fine arts have

no end beyond themselves. The useful arts.. . provide transportation or shelter, but a
play or symphony cannot be used for anything but 'pleasure.'") with GEOFFREY F.
MILLER, THE MATING MIND: How SEXUAL CHOICE SHAPED THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN

NATURE 267 (2000) (acknowledging that "[fline art may be strictly useless in pragmatic
terms" while attempting to reconcile "the aesthetic made useless" with "the useful
made aesthetic"). See also GEORGE BERNARD SHAw, THE INTELLIGENT WOMAN'S GUIDE
TO SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM 91 (Ayot St. Lawrence ed., 1931) ("Labor is doing what
we must; leisure is doing what we like; rest is doing nothing whilst our bodies and our
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these positions leads me straight to a deluxe suite at the "very
small hotel" that will be hosting the next "global convention of
rabid free-trade environmentalists."8
These preferences - nature over nurture, leisure over labor
- embody two criteria for assessing claims for exceptions to free
trade as an international legal norm. First, the interests to be
shielded should be incommensurate. If no amount of economic
growth or increase in political liberty can offset the threatened
loss, trade should be constrained. On the other hand,
international trade law should view with extreme suspicion any
claims that are easily manipulated vehicles for economic
protectionism. This second criterion, skepticism, counsels vigilance
against protectionist wolves cloaked in woolly talk about
"national interests,"
"public order," and "precautionary
prudence." 9
B.

WORLD WAR 2.5

Globalization and Its Losers triggered vigorous criticism.
Syracuse historian Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, outraged at what she
calls my "crass attempt to apply Darwinism to social life,"10
denounces my "offhand" disregard of "jobs and culture[s]"
threatened by globalization. 1 She decries my putatively "starved
conceptions of democracy and culture," particularly my
"diminished notion of culture as a collection of commodities vying
for consumption."1 2 Professor Lasch-Quinn describes me as a shill
for the shrewd but deceptive marketing of globalization as "a
massive
movement of economic self-interest" favoring
"multinational corporations" and "other world elites." 13
John Miller, a history professor at South Dakota State
University, also criticizes the metaphorical prominence of

minds are recovering from their fatigue."); OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTuRE OF DORIAN
GRAY 42 (Norman Page ed., Broadview Press 1998) (1890) ("All art is quite useless.").
8. Daniel A. Farber, Environmental Federalismin a Global Economy, 83 VA. L.
REV. 1283, 1284 (1997).
9. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: Assessing the
PrecautionaryPrinciple and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 TEX.
INT'L L.J. 173 (2000); Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary
Principle,53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851 (1996).

10. Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn, Democracy Should Not Have Losers, 9 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 589, 593 (2000).
11. Id. at 590-91.
12. Id. at 592.
13. Id. at 593.
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"Darwinian evolution" in my essay. 14 He couches his concern for
industries such as "steel, petroleum, and agricultural
production"' 5 within a more comprehensive defense of "the
importance of place in the quality of [human] lives." 16 Ultimately
unpersuaded by my "central metaphor,"'1 7 Professor Miller
suggests a variety of rhetorical alternatives, such as theater,
18
sports, and education.
Paul B. Thompson, a philosophy professor at Purdue and the
author of a treatise on agricultural ethics, 19 criticizes my failure to
recognize alternative "way[s] of defining property rights and
market structure" in a globalized economy. 20 "[M] arket structure
and incentives," he observes, "are an artifact created by
government, not natural or unchangeable characteristics of an
ecological niche."'2' He praises the European Union's agricultural
policies, particularly those which engage citizens as consumers
and as voters, in stark contrast with the industrial, commodity22
centered model of agricultural regulation in the United States.
He advocates a "neo-agrarian" philosophy that views agriculture
as a "multi-functional" activity, with cultural and environmental
23
components independent of its economic significance.
Finally, Robert Wolf, executive director of Free River Press
and the editor of a recent anthology of folk literature, 24 condemns
me as the embodiment of "the centralized world-view of modernday rationalism." 25 He disputes the factual premises of
Globalization and Its Losers, arguing instead that globalization
has fueled gross economic inequality, 26 occasioned "great ecological
14. John Miller, Globalization and Its Metaphors, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 594,
594(2000).
15. Id. at 597.
16. Id. at 599.
17. Id. at 601.
18. See id. at 600-01.
19. See PAUL B. THOMPSON, AGRICULTURAL ETHICS: RESEARCH, TEACHING, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1998).

20. Paul B. Thompson, Globalization, Losers and Property Rights, 9 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 602, 602 (2000); see id. at 606 ("Like many economic analysts, Chen
appears to presume that... [the] U.S. market structure is 'natural' or perhaps an
instance of emergent order.").
21. Id. at 604.
22. See id. at 606.
23. Id. at 609.
24. See AN AMERICAN MOSAIC: PROSE AND POETRY BY EVERYDAY FOLK (Robert
Wolfed., 1999) [hereinafter AMERICAN MOSAIC].
25. Robert Wolf, The Regionalist Answer, 9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 610, 610
(2000).
26. See id. at 612-13.
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devastation in Third World countries,"27 and eroded democratic
values. 28 Mr. Wolf proposes a comprehensive "quiltwork of
regional economies" as an antidote to a worldwide "process of
[economic and cultural] homogenization which an increasing
number of people perceive as soulless and dehumanizing. "29
All four critics condemn globalization as an evil phenomenon.
Professor Lasch-Quinn summarizes my critics' collective attitude:
trade and economic integration bear the blame for the
"cheapening of the cultural environment" and "drastic inequalities
of wealth and attendant social divisions, together with
tremendous economic instability."30 These complaints echo the
"darker voices" that have haunted the otherwise triumphant
history of the American republic, the voices that have decried
economic concentration and the decay of traditional institutions. 31
My critics repeat the funereal note struck by Robert Frost in "The
Death of the Hired Man": globalization's losers have "Nothing to
look backward to with pride, / And nothing to look forward to with
32
hope."

Even by legal scholarship's tough standards, this is bareknuckled criticism. 33 The harsh tone may stem partly from certain
epistemological differences. Three of my critics are humanities
professors; none has a law degree. All four express varying
degrees of disagreement with the evolutionary metaphor. By
resorting to economics and evolution, the most dismal of social and
biological sciences, I have invited the wrath of an elite corps of
"natural Luddites," the "Western intellectuals [who] have never
tried, wanted, or been able to understand the industrial
revolution, much less accept it."34
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 613.
See id. at 614-15.
Id. at 621.
Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 592.
31.
CHRISTOPHER LASCH, THE TRuE AND ONLY HEAVEN: PROGRESS AND ITS
CRITICS 39 (1991); accord Jon Lauck, "The Silent Artillery of Time": Understanding
Social Change in the Rural Midwest, 19 GREAT PLAINS Q. 245, 245 (1999); cf Samuel
Taylor Coleridge, Kubla Khan, or a Vision in a Dream, in THE COMPLETE POETICS
WORKS OF SAMUEL TAYLOR COLERIDGE 295, 298 at 11.29-30 (Ernest Hartley Coleridge
ed., Oxford University Press 1912) (1816) ("Ancestral voices prophesying war!"). See
generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
32. Robert Frost, The Death of the Hired Man, in COMPLETE POEMS OF ROBERT
FROST 49, 52 at 11.103-04 (Holt, Reinhart and Winston 1962) (1914).
33. Cf., e.g., Alan D. Freeman, Truth and Mystification In Legal Scholarship, 90
YALE L.J. 1229, 1230 (1981) ("[T]rashing is fun. I love trashing."). See generally Mark
G. Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984).
34. C.P. SNOW, THE Two CULTURES: AND A SECOND LOOK 22 (2d ed. 1965). Snow
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At bottom, though, this is a debate whose very nature stirs
intense emotions. Globalization is probably the most contentious
philosophical issue underlying the law of trade and development.
Like anti-Communist hysteria and identity politics, it triggers
fighting words3 5 and fosters zealotry. 36 It is an ideological struggle
more than half a century in the making. Opposing combatants
promote irreconcilable solutions for the secular salvation of
billions. Stakes this high are bound to inspire vehemence worthy
of Egon Schiele, and perhaps also incoherence worthy of Jackson
Pollock.
Thanks to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the United
States' de facto victory in the Cold War, debates over globalization
are the primary, perhaps exclusive, battlegrounds where the
legacy of the Second World War is still contested. Anticipating
victory, the allied powers convened in Bretton Woods in 1944 to
stabilize the postwar economy. The resulting institutions - the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the
International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (the "World Bank") - have
facilitated a period of unprecedented prosperity.3 7 Arguably as
important to international peacekeeping as NATO, the European
Union, and the United Nations, these institutions have heralded
38
what I call pax mercatoria.
Although the capital-exporting, tax-evading multinational
wrote of competing literary and scientific cultures, but he acknowledged the rise of a
social science culture. Compare id. (attributing anti-industrial hostility to "literary
intellectuals" above all others) with id. at 70 (identifying the rise of "something like a
third culture," a community of social scientists "concerned with how human beings are
living or have lived"). See also SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 7-11 (1995) (contrasting legal culture with scientific
culture). Much of the globalization debate represents an intramural squabble within
this third culture.
35. Cf Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
36. See generally NEIL HAMILTON, ZEALOTRY AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A LEGAL
AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 55-106, 248-55, 328-38 (1995) (describing the
"fundamentalism of the academic left" as the most recent wave of zealotry to sweep
through American academia).
37. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 55 U.N.T.S. 194; Articles of
Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, July 22, 1994, entered into force Dec.
27, 1945; Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, opened for signature, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, 2
U.N.T.S. 134. See generally KENNETH W. DAM, THE RULES OF THE GAME: REFORM AND
EVOLUTION IN THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1982); Gerald M. Meier, The

Bretton Woods Agreement - 25 Years Later, 23 STAN. L. REV. 235 (1971); Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Is There Law After Bretton Woods?, 50 U. CIR. L. REV. 380 (1983)
(reviewing DAM, supra).
38. See Chen, supra note 3, at 169.
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corporation supposedly epitomizes globalization run amok,39
government evidently still matters. Globalization's most vocal
losers have trained the power of popular protest on the World
Trade Organization (WTO) and its sister organizations. 40 As
"power seeps upwards" to the WTO, IMF, and World Bank, "so
does the attention of interest groups." 41 Critics routinely accuse
the Bretton Woods institutions of eroding not only national

sovereignty but also the labor42 and environmental interests
guarded by national legislation.
The so-called Battle in Seattle - the December 1999 riot
that derailed the opening of the WTO's millennial round of trade
talks - has now attained hallowed status in the localist canon.
A common hatred of multilateral organizations, free trade, and

global integration has united Ralph Nader with Pat Buchanan,
the far left with the far right in group therapy for electoral
college frustration. But "America's first post-modern riot" relied
on the very phenomenon it condemned. 43 The protesters
organized via the Internet and traveled in established channels
of interstate and international commerce. 44 They amassed what

39. See Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 593; Wolf, supra note 25, at 614
(condemning "megalithic" corporations" for their assault on "our republican form of
government... through their campaign contributions"). For a more sober assessment
of the global economic impact of multinational corporations, see ORGANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, MEASURING GLOBALISATION: THE ROLE
OF MULTINATIONALS IN OECD ECONOMIES (1999).
40. Under the treaty concluding the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks,
see General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15,
1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994), the WTO assumed all responsibilities theretofore
exercised by GATT. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, The GATT-WTO System at Fifty,
16 WiS. INT'L L.J. 421 (1998).
41. Peter J. Spiro, New Global Potentates,Nongovernmental Organizationsand
the "Unregulated"Market Place, 18 CARDOZo L. REV. 957, 958 (1996).
42. See, e.g., Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United
States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 634-43 (1994); Robert F. Housman,
DemocratizingInternational Trade Decision-Making, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 699, 73437 (1994); Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization,InternationalInstitutions,and the Erosion
of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1944, 1945-47 (1997). See
generally Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade
Organization:Lessons from the History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
775, 793-94 (1999) (reviewing the relevant legal literature).
43. Gerard Baker, Starbucks Wars, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1999, at 10.
44. Cf Frank H. Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public
Choice Perspective, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1328, 1335 (1994) (recognizing how advances in
transportation and communications have enhanced the ability of interest groups to
extract rents from government); John 0. McGinnis, The OriginalConstitution and Its
Decline: A Public Choice Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 195, 208 (1997)
(same).
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would be, under the circumstances, an embarrassing number of
frequent flyer miles. Populist rage at international
organizations now takes the form of hacker attacks on the
WTO's Web site. 45 Like the most decadent of the Twelve
Southerners who wrote the agrarian manifesto I'll Take My
industry and trade prefer being
Stand,46 the newest enemies of 47
"Agrarian[s] by remote control."
It is not unreasonable to view the quartet of responses to
Globalization and Its Losers as an academic analogue of the
Seattle protests. Both episodes are heavy on rhetoric and
relatively light on law. This is neither surprising nor
objectionable. Especially when the environment hangs in the
balance, "[r]hetoric matters."48 My critics have nary a law degree
among them, and for my part, I have glossed over the technical
details of specific trade law controversies. Especially in the hands
of "lawyers (and other amateurs),"49 economics is more of a
persuasive art than a quantitative discipline.50 My critics are
neither lawyers nor economists, and I claim no more than passing
familiarity with such economic concepts as comparative advantage
and public choice. What we can competently debate is the ideology
and political economy of globalization. Dogma, not doctrine, is the
order of the day. With that concession, and with full knowledge
that "joining issue is the sincerest form of flattery,"51 I now
respond.
C.

RIPOSTE AND RECONSIDERATION

I shall address three overarching themes. First, I shall defend
my use of Darwinian metaphors and analysis. Part II of this essay
addresses to a deep-seated academic hostility to the application of

45. See Kevin J. Delaney, Walking the Line Online: Protestors Pick at Their
Keyboards to Make TheirPoint, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 30, 2000, at 25.
46. TWELVE SOUTHERNERS, I'LL TAKE MY STAND: THE SOUTH AND THE AGRARIAN
TRADITION (1930).
47. W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOuTH 383 (1941) (observing that Stark Young,
a contributor to I'll Take My Stand and author of the Confederate romance, So RED
THE ROSE (1934), "prefer[red] to live in New York" and "served the New Republic as
drama critic").
48. Holly Doremus, The Rhetoric and Reality of Nature Protection:Toward a New
Discourse, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 11, 11 (2000).
49. George J. Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Literature of Economics: The Case
of Berle and Means, 26 J.L. & ECON. 237, 241 (1983).
50.

See generally D..N. MCCLOSKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS 54-86 (1985).

51. Lynn A. Baker, InterdisciplinaryDue Diligence: The Case for Common Sense
in the Search for the Swing Justice, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 187 n.* (1996).
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evolutionary outside biology. Since 1870 two global economies
have risen; only one has fallen.52 A new, less rooted class of
economic "epiphytes" has thrived in these vacated niches - not in
spite of its rootlessness, but because of it.
Because so much of the criticism of Globalization and Its
Losers consists of a defense of agrarian political theory, in its
traditional and its "neo-agrarian" incarnations, 3 I shall more fully
explain the place of agriculture in international economic law. To
the extent that a law review article can meaningfully assess
agrarianism, Part III engages this debate. The material and
political advantages that my critics tout in defense of agrarianism
cannot withstand closer scrutiny. A persistent source of
inspiration for opponents of globalization, agrarianism may be the
most thoroughly destructive philosophy in international economic
relations.
Three of my four critics having implicitly accepted my
argument that environmental protection should prevail whenever
it conflicts with full employment, 54 Part IV will shift the focus
squarely onto matters of human welfare. Even in their own
preferred arena of combat, however, my critics have failed to
address the severest and most pressing human issues facing
globalized society. Billions continue to live in poverty; the real
question is whether engagement in or withdrawal from the global
52. See generally ERIC HOBSBAWN, THE AGE OF EMPIRE: 1875-1914 (1987)
(describing this first wave of globalization as based on the conquest and colonization
of non-European lands).
53. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 609 (defining neo-agrarianism and
distinguishing it from more conventional variants of agrarianism).
54. See Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 591 (approving of my "passionate defense
of biodiversity" and my endorsement of legal "obligations to engage only in
[sustainable] practices"); Miller, supra note 14, at 594 (acknowledging that "[simallscale communities often are... more dangerous to the environment than are largescale ones"); Thompson, supra note 20, at 602 ("I agree that a more globalized market
generally allows more efficient use of natural capital"). Robert Wolf does direct
justifiable rage at contemporary environmental travesties, but he assigns exclusive
blame to multinational corporations, their customers, and international organizations
such as the IMF and World Bank. See Wolf, supra note 25, at 613-14. He offers no
response to the proposition that poverty and ignorance exacerbate environmental
problems, see World Bank, The Environment: A Global Challenge at www.worldbank.
org/htmllextdr/gclenviromnent/ environment.htm (last visited Oct. 23, 2000), much less
a more comprehensive assessment of the environmental impact of free trade. See
generally Robert E. Hudec, Differences in National Environmental Standards: The
Level-Playing-FieldDimension, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 1 (1996); John H. Jackson,
World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies: Congruence or Conflict?, 49 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1227 (1992); Thomas J. Schoenbaum, InternationalTrade and Protection
of the Environment: Irreconcilable Conflict?, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 700 (1992). See also
infra text accompanying notes 358-366.
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economy would better alleviate such suffering. Delivering material
succor to the world's losers is a goal we all claim, and I am
prepared to pit my prescriptive vision against that of my critics.
In economic terms, the backlash against globalization consists
of a call for inefficiency, for "sand in the gears" of economic
engines. 5 At a minimum, the opponents of globalization advocate
productive inefficiency, so many technologically superseded
workers can continue to command higher wages and by extension
a bigger slice of the overall economic pie. There is a darker but
quite distinct possibility that today's localists would affirmatively
favor allocative inefficiency. If their preferred segments of society
cannot benefit to the same extent as globalization's biggest
winners, these critics would rather level downward and eliminate
all social surpluses. They pursue a troubling sort of equality.
Localist in varying degrees, my critics indulge in what I call
the politics of place. They defend the First World farmers and
workers who no longer command lucrative returns on labor in a
world increasingly detached from geographically contingent
factors of production. The dislocations that capture most of the
developed world's political attention are emphatically not famine,
pestilence, warfare, and death throughout the developing world.
Localism in an epiphytic economy would stifle wealth creation and
constrict political freedom across the globe, all in order to shelter
incumbent economic interests in Europe, Japan, and North
America. To attain any genuine measure of social justice on a
global scale, we must eliminate First World localism.
II. OF EVOLUTION AND EPIPHYTES
A. THE OLD ORDER
Like Globalization and Its Losers itself, this rejoinder will
begin with a metaphoric application of natural history to
contemporary law and policy.5 6 A rather strange religious subtext

permeates my critics' attack on my Darwinian metaphor. Even as
Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn chides me for the "pretentious" allusion to
the Pauline epistles, 57 Robert Wolf accuses me of contempt for the
55. Nicholas Lemann, No Man's Town, NEW YORKER, June 5, 2000, at 42, 48.
56. See Chen, supra note 3, at 158-60.
57. Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 590 (imagining "Darwin rolling in his grave"
in response to a passage in which I "cite[] [my] bible"). The offending passage read as
follows: "Now abide labor, culture, and ecology, these three. And the least of these is
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religious traditions represented by "Socrates, Jesus, the Buddha,
Confucius, and St. Francis."5 8 Meanwhile, John Miller invokes the
Hebrew Bible as he decries the normative vacuum at the heart of
biological evolution.5 9 Such incoherence and internal contradiction
strongly suggest that I struck a raw nerve. Like Upton Sinclair, I
aimed at my collective readership's head and by accident hit my
critics in the gut. 60 In yet another intellectual arena, I have
become "the demon for all academic seasons, the villain with a
61
thousand voices."
From this critical cacophony, one clear note does emerge. My
critics accuse me of reviving social Darwinism, that hoary blend of
sociology and evolutionary science that attained its greatest62
popularity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
According to Professor Lasch-Quinn, I use social Darwinism to
"cast globalization as an unstoppable force whose progress is
predestined."63 Despite acknowledging my advocacy of "wealth
transfers" through law, Professor Miller equates my acceptance of
many "market-driven social and economic change[s]" with the
social Darwinists' willingness "to sacrifice entire categories 64
of
people to the steamroller of economic growth and development."
These accusations are baseless. I reject Herbert Spencer's
vulgarization of natural selection as "survival of the fittest."65 Nor
do I endorse Julian Huxley's characterization of evolutionary
progress as "increased control over and independence of the
environment."66 The Darwinian process - the actual biological
phenomenon as opposed to any sociological projection of its
significance - does not represent an inexorable march toward
labor." Chen, supra note 3, at 217. I indeed intended the biblical allusion but did not
cite 1 Corinthians 13:13.
58. Wolf, supra note 25, at 615.
59. See Miller, supra note 14, at 598 & n.ll (citing Psalms 8:5).
60. Cf FLOYD DELL, UPTON SINCLAIR: A STUDY IN SOCIAL PROTEST 106 (1927)
(reporting Upton Sinclair's lament over the public reaction to THE JUNGLE (1906): "The
author later remarked that he had aimed at the public's heart and by accident had hit
it in the stomach.").
61. Jim Chen, Untenured but Unrepentant, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1609, 1610 (1996)
(footnotes omitted).
62. Or, roughly speaking, during the first globalized era between 1870 and 1914.
See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER,

(1992).
63.
64.
65.

SOCIAL DARWINISM LN AMERICAN THOUGHT

Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 590.
Miller, supra note 14, at 596.
HERBERT SPENCER, 1 THE PRINCIPLES OF BIOLOGY 457 (1897); Herbert

Spencer, A Theory of Population,Deduced from the General Law of Animal Fertility,62
WESTMINSTER REV. 468, 499-500 (1852).
66.

JULIAN S. HUXLEY, EVOLUTION: THE MODERN SYNTHESIS 564-65 (1942).
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"progress." Diversity in life forms, not complexity as such, is the
true hallmark of evolutionary success. 67 By this natural standard,
the "transient dominion" of the last surviving hominid species
promises "[n]either intrinsic superiority [n]or prospects for
extended survival."68 To the extent that Professor Lasch-Quinn is
implicitly trying to engage me in the longstanding intellectual
battle over the notion of progress, 69 she should observe that the
evolutionary metaphor negates rather than affirms the possibility
of progress.
I do stand guilty of a charge lodged by Professor Miller.
Evolution as rhetorical framework "lack[s] ...a standard of
value." 0 Globalization and Its Losers used the evolutionary
metaphor merely to describe economic and social losses
attributable to globalization, not to prescribe any policies or
preferences in light of such losses. Darwinian evolution, properly
understood, makes no ideological commitments. Observers more
sympathetic to my critics' social concerns have applied the same
metaphor. 71 At most I am rehearsing and sharpening my "skill in
wielding metaphors and symbols," my aptitude for "us[ing] ...
72
symbolic intuition to uncover general patterns of resemblance."
I neither am the first nor will be the last nonbiologist to
exploit this tool. A systematic influx of Darwinian ideas has
73
touched off a miniature revolution in the social sciences.
Extinction, a natural phenomenon, "also threatens things that do
not fit" strictly biological categories, such as "cultural behavior

67. See, e.g., STEPHEN JAY GOULD, FULL HOUSE: THE SPREAD OF EXCELLENCE
FROM PLATO TO DARWIN 19-21 (1996).

68.
69.

Id. at 73.
See text accompanying note 63. See generally, e.g., LASCH, supra note 31;

ROBERT A. NISBET, THE HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1993).

70. Miller, supra note 14, at 597.
71. See A. Dan Tarlock, Can Cowboys Become Indians? Protecting Western
Communities as Endangered Cultural Remnants, 31 ARIz. ST. L.J. 539, 539 (1999)
(according "more legitima[cy] than many have assumed" to claims that rural
communities in the western United States "represent endangered cultures that should
be preserved").
72. RICHARD DAwKINS, UNWEAVING THE RAINBOW: SCIENCE, DELUSION AND THE
APPETITE FOR WONDER 186 (1998); accord William H. Rodgers, Jr., The Most Creative
Moments in the History of Environmental Law: The Who's, 39 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 9
(1999).
73.

See generally THE ADAPTED MIND: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND THE

GENERATION OF CULTURE (Jerome H. Barkow, Leda Cosmides & John Tooby eds.
1992); D.E. BROWN, HUMAN UNIVERSALS (1991); CARL N. DEGNER, IN SEARCH OF
HUMAN NATURE: THE DECLINE AND REVIVAL OF DARWINISM IN AMERICAN SOCIAL

THOUGHT (1991).
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patterns" and "cultural artifacts." 4 In stark contrast with the
standard social science model, the integrated causal model of
evolutionary psychology examines human behavior in the context
of the larger natural world in which it evolved. 75 In legal
78
academia, an intellectual community that imports its best ideas,
a growing body of scholarship heralds a neo-Darwinian avant
garde.77 The second global economy, made possible by the
international order and industrial apparatus born of the world
wars that destroyed its predecessor, 78 has inflicted catastrophic
losses on less mobile forms of capital and labor.
Evolution is an especially apt metaphor for a world driven by
technological change and social upheaval. John Miller 79 and Paul
Thompson8 0 acknowledge the debt that evolutionary economics
owes to Darwinism. 8 ' It is almost impossible to speak of
technological change and the economic drivers of development
without acknowledging this contribution. Economists already
lament that "current discussions on regulatory reform do not give
74. Fred P. Bosselman, Extinction and the Law: Protection of Religiously
Motivated Behavior, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 15 (1993).
75.

See generally EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE

(1998).
76. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987).
77. See, e.g., Cheryl Hanna, Can a BiologicalInquiry Help Reduce Male Violence
Against Females? Or What's a Nice "Gal"like Me Doing at a Conference like This?, 22
VT. L. REV. 333 (1997); Cheryl Hanna, Sometimes Sex Matters: Reflections on Biology,
Sexual Aggression, and Its Implications for the Law, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 261 (1999);
John 0. McGinnis, The Human Constitution and ConstitutiveLaw: A Prolegomenon, 8
J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 211 (1997); John 0. McGinnis, The Original Constitution
and Our Origins, HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 251 (1996).
78. See generally David A. Westbrook, Law Through War, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 299
(2000) (delineating a jurisprudence of war).
79. See Miller, supra note 14, at 595 (acknowledging some "similarity between
what happens in the international marketplace and what happens in the biological
realm").
80. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 604 (acknowledging the economic
advantages of large producers in a policy environment that reduces the "potential for
losses from investments that expand production and increase yields than from limiting
expenses or shifting to alternative crops and other value-added activities").
81. See, e.g., RIcHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY
THEORY OF ECONOMIC CHANGE (1982); THE ELGAR COMPANION TO INSTITUTIONAL AND
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS (Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al. eds., 1994); Armen A. Alchian,
Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950); Giovanni
Dosi & Richard R. Nelson, An Introductionto Evolutionary Theories in Economics, 4 J.
EVOLUTIONARY ECON. 153 (1994); E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in
Jurisprudence,85 COLUM. L. REv. 38 (1985); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in
Law and Economics, 109 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1996); Hal Varian, The Law of
Recombinant Growth, THE INDUS.
STD., Mar. 6, 2000, available at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/display/0,1151,11884,00.html.
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adequate attention to considerations of dynamic efficiency."8 2 This
is a gross oversight, for "[t]he static gains and losses from
regulation are probably small compared to the historical gains in
welfare resulting from innovation and productivity growth."8 3 The
growing prominence of advanced biotechnology in international
law and the global economy makes a practical necessity of
evolutionary thinking.8 4 We can no longer afford to ignore
Darwinism simply because some intellectuals feel repulsed by its
misapplication during a previous generation. "[R]ather than
trying to conform" the scientific method to some set of "moral
values," perhaps we should apply "scientific theories" as if they
85
were designed to "account for facts and inspire new research."
There is perhaps an even darker explanation for my critics'
outrage. Today's academic left harbors almost as much hostility to
Darwinism as does the unschooled right.8 6 This should not be
especially
surprising;
postmodernists
and
religious
fundamentalists alike reject the Enlightenment.87 The left-wing
variant of creationism merely replaces the intelligent designer of
Genesis with the tabula rasa, the Skinner box, and other icons of
social determinism. Whether it comes from the left or the right,
ideological tyranny over science rarely serves "progressive,
humanitarian" ends.8 8 The "blank slate" of the standard social
science model "is a dictator's dream."8 9 Untouched by the neoDarwinian revolution, today's academic left can only repeat the
tired postmodern mantra in which "[t]here is no good [or] evil," in

82. Ha-Joon Chang, The Economics and Politicsof Regulation, 21 CAMB. J. ECON.
703, 721 (1997).
83. Paul L. Joskow & Nancy L. Rose, The Effects of Economic Regulation, in 2
HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1449, 1484 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert
D. Willig eds., 1989) ("It is distressing that so little effort has been devoted to
measuring the effects of regulation on innovation and productivity growth").
84. See Ryan M.T. Iwasaka, Note, Chakrabartyto Chimeras: The Growing Need
for EvolutionaryBiology in Patent Law, 109 YALE L.J. 1505 (2000).
85. MILLER, supra note 7, at 137; see also STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE
INsTINcT: How THE MIND CREATES LANGUAGE 427 (1994) ("Wishing for [science] to
work in some way as a shortcut to justifying some ethical principle undermines both
the science and ethics (for what happens to the principle if the scientific facts turn out
to go the other way?).").
86. Or, for that matter, the erudite right. Cf Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v.
Freiler, 120 S. Ct. 2706, 2709 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(mocking "the much beloved secular legend of the Monkey Trial").
87. See generally Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J. 453, 457-64
(1996).
88. PINKER, supra note 85, at 427.
89. Id.
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which "there is only power, and those too weak to seek it."9°
A phenomenon as complex and comprehensive as
globalization demands all the tools in the kit. Evolutionary
economics, evolutionary psychology, and even plain vanilla
evolutionary biology all bear on the subject. Among other things, a
dollop of Darwinian insight would expose the impossibility of any
legal agenda premised on the supposed agrarian virtue of
"voluntary simplicity."9 1 No tyrant, whether cloaked in
governmental garb or ecclesiastical vestments, could banish
"consumerism, leisure, and delirious pursuit of novelty"9 2 more
readily than he or she could abolish sex, for the reproductive
impulse is the source of all of these putative vices. 93 Or, to pick a
more tangible example, the intractable nature of wetlands
preservation arises from humans' biological preference for "treestudded land on prominences overlooking water."94 Thanks to
"humans' love for proximity to water," wetlands tend to "be
attractive sites for development." 95 Therein lies a more general
truth: Much of what postmodernism regards as an arbitrary social
construct 96 is actually the expression of "biophilia," or the "innate
tendency" that leads human beings "to focus on life and lifelike
processes," "to distinguish life from the inanimate," and to value
"In]ovelty and diversity."97
Our understanding of the law and economics of development
90. J.K ROWLING, HARRY POrrER AND THE SORCERER'S STONE 291 (1997); cf
Daniel A. Farber, Missing the "Playof Intelligence," 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 147, 159
(1994) (describing the academic debate over affirmative action, one profoundly touched
by postmodern thought, as "hav[ing] worn deep grooves repeating the same basic
arguments and counter arguments over and over").
91. Gene Logsdon, The Importance of Traditional Farming Practices for a
Sustainable Agriculture, in MEETING THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE LAND: ESSAYS IN
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE AND STEWARDSHIP 3, 18 (Wes Jackson, Wendell Berry &
Bruce Coleman eds., 1984).
92. Id.
93. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 258-91.
94. Edward 0. Wilson, Biophilia 110 (1984); see generally Robert S. Ultrich,
Biophilla, Biophobia, and Natural Landscapes, in The Biophilia Hypothesis 73
(Stephen R. Ekller & Edard 0. Wilson eds., 1993); Judith H. Heerwager & Gordon
H. Orians, Humans, Habits, and Aesthetics, in supra, at 138.
95. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
AND POLICY 975 (2d ed. 1996). But cf Leovy v. United States, 177 U.S. 621, 636 (1900)
(describing the "remov[all" of wetlands as "nuisances" as a "legitimate[] exercise]" of
"the police power"); JOIIN A. KUSLER, OUR NATIONAL WETLAND HERITAGE: A
PROTECTION GUIDEBOOK 1 (1983) (describing the long history of public subsidies for
the draining and filling of wetlands as "wastelands, sources of mosquitos and
impediments to development and travel").
96. See Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 592-93.
97. WILSON, supra note 94, at 1.
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would improve exponentially if we treated human history as a
branch of natural history.98 Among other things, a biologically
informed perspective shows that differences in initial natural
endowments account for much of the material inequality in
today's world. 99 There is actually a perverse relationship between
absolute biological diversity and contemporary socioeconomic
welfare: the temperate, relatively nondiverse portions of the
northern hemisphere had precisely the combination of plant and
animal candidates for domestication that vaulted Eurasia to
global domination. Meanwhile, the tropical islands that shelter
much of the world's biodiversity pose formidable physical barriers
to human habitation and development. 10 0 We finally have an
answer to that bitter question, "How did a continent of berries
become a global power?" 101 Ironically, it isn't diversity per se, but
rather the right combination of factor endowments that dictates
the wealth of nations.
In short, refusing to consider evolutionary insights because
social Darwinists co-opted the concept of natural selection for
odious ideological purposes is akin to eschewing Goethe simply
because Goebbels also spoke German. Ideologically committed to a
categorical rejection of Darwinian reasoning, my critics cannot
meaningfully assess the contributions of evolutionary economics
and psychology to a legal analysis of globalization. "Warum stehen
Sie davor? /Ist nicht Tare da und Tor?"10 2 With that invitation, I
now extend the biological metaphor that I launched in
Globalizationand Its Losers.

98. See JARED DiAMOND, GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL: THE FATES OF HUMAN
SOCIETIES 405-25 (1997); HUGO HASSINGER, GEOGRAPHISCHE GRUNDLAGEN DER
GEScHIcHTE (2d ed. 1953). Contra Wolf, supra note 25, at 610 ("Relating a possibility
in human history to a fact of natural history is a mistake.").
99. See DIAMOND, supra note 98, at 25, 409-17. But cf. DAVID S. LANDES, THE
WEALTH AND POVERTY OF NATIONS: WHY SOME ARE So RICH AND SOME SO POOR
(1998) (attributing national differences in wealth to cultural differences).
100. See Barbara Crossette, Small Islands, Big Trouble: Looking for Paradise?
Keep Looking, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2000, § 4, at 1.
101. CALESTOUS JUMA, THE GENE HUNTERS: BIOTECHNOLOGY AND THE SCRAMBLE
FOR SEEDS 51-52 (1989) (attributing the United States' success to "plant introduction,
technical change and institutional reform"); accord Neil D. Hamilton, Who Owns
Dinner: Evolving Legal Mechanisms for Ownership of Plant Genetic Resources, 28
TULSA L.J. 587, 607-08 (1993).
102. GOETHES GEDICHTE IN ZEITLICHER FOLGE 1074 (Heinz Nicolai pub., 1997).
Herewith an inelegant English translation of these lines, engraved by the entrance to
Goethe's home in Weimar: "What are you standing there for? Open the gate and door."
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AN ORCHID'S-EYE VIEW OF THE WORLD

My critics did not articulate one complaint that I had
anticipated. The typical popular image of evolution as a slow,
gradual process conflicts with the reality of globalization as
Blitzkrieg. Natural history, we now understand, is not a steady
progression. At the dawn of the modern era, the contrary point of
view was firmly entrenched. A faith in incremental observations
and orderly predictability characterized both social and natural
science. Natura non facit saltum, said economist and ecologist
alike. 10 3 No longer. Nature does indeed take fantastic leaps;
evolution proceeds by fits and starts. Though more widely
accepted than any other explanation, 0 4 the meteor impact theory
of dinosaur extinction still carries a shockingly "apocalyptic
flavour."10 5 The human brain's great leap forward took place6
10
during a relatively brief phase in the evolution of Homo sapiens.
Lake Victoria's cichlids, after being decimated by the introduction
of the Nile perch, are staging an impressive display of adaptive
radiation. 07 Evolution among smaller organisms is blindingly
fast, to the dismay of epidemiologists and entomologists. 08
Globalization, to extend the metaphor, is to human history as
a meteor strike or some other comparably catastrophic
disturbance is to geological history. Even before the Second World
War, "creative destruction" of firms and institutions had already
set the economic trajectory that would eventually propel the West
103. Compare 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS, at xiii (9th ed.
1961) (1890) with LINNAEUS, PHILOSOPmIA BOTANICA § 77 (1750).
104. See generally Luis W. Alvarez et al., ExtraterrestrialCausefor the CretaceousTertiaryExtinction, 208 SCIENCE 1095 (1980).
105. RICHARD FORTEY, LIFE: A NATURAL HISTORY OF THE FIRST FOUR BILLION
YEARS OF LIFE ON EARTH 253 (1997); see also id. at 260 (describing the professional
debate over the Cretaceous-Tertiary boundary as signaling the end of "the innocence of
the world").
106. See MILLER, supra note 7, at 17-18 (noting that brain expansion distinguished
genus Homo from its primate relatives between two million and 100,000 years before
the present and that the achievements comprising human civilization occurred much
later).
107. See Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Lake Victoria's Lightning-FastOrigin of Species, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 1996, at C1.
108. See, e.g., LAURIE GARRETr, THE COMING PLAGUE: NEWLY EMERGING
DISEASES IN A WORLD OUT OF BALANCE 414 (1994) (describing the speed with which
bacteria mutate, especially in response to antibiotics); MATT RIDLEY, THE RED QUEEN:
SEX AND THE EVOLUTION OF HUMAN NATURE 66 (1993) (noting that because "parasites
are usually smaller than their hosts," parasitic bacteria "pass through more
generations in a given time than their hosts"). See generally David P. Fidler, The
Globalization of Public Health: Emerging Infectious Diseases and International
Relations, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 11 (1997).
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past its fascist and communist rivals. 10 9 The war itself merely
accelerated the process. Roughly half a century after V-J Day,
America realized its true victory. Economic integration and
technological standardization, mostly on terms favorable to or
even dictated by the United States, have minimized "geographical,
religious, and political differences" to such an extent that "a
Christian bank clerk in Chicago, a Buddhist bank clerk in Tokyo,
and a... bank clerk in [formerly communist] Moscow" lead
essentially identical lives.' 10 The sheer success of the American
model of globalization explains much of the backlash against it.
Economic and social niches of long standing have evaporated.
Others have taken their place, but mostly for the benefit of new
actors and at the expense of established businesses and
institutions. The resulting "frustrat[ion]" and "sense of
powerlessness" have inspired anarchic, sometimes violent
reactions to globalization." 1
In other words, globalization's impact on civilization roughly
resembles what happened to the natural world across the
Cretaceous-Tertiary boundary. Social institutions and economic
actors, old and new, are fiercely competing in a profoundly
disturbed environment. Human institutions are undergoing the
sort of adaptive radiation that characterized the Eocene explosion
in mammalian diversity. Although professional economists are
recognition that a
withholding their final judgment, there is broad
"new economy" may in fact be taking shape.'1 2
The evidence of economic revolution is strongest in the
1 3
United States, the epicenter of contemporary globalization.
Although the United States "is already at the world productivity
frontier in many industries," the thorough development and
diffusion of information and communications technologies have
sustained stronger non-inflationary growth for nearly two
decades."14 Throughout this period, the United States has led
109. See generally JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND
DEMOCRACY 81-86 (1942).
110. LYON SPRAGUE DE CAMP, THE ANCIENT ENGINEERS 17 (1988).
111. Industrial Society and Its Future, supp. to WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1995, 67,
at 2 (Unabomber manifesto).
112. See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, Is THERE
A NEW ECONOMY? FIRST REPORT ON THE OECD GROWTH PROJECT 3 (2000) [hereinafter
NEW ECONOMY].
113. See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING
GLOBALIZATION 308 (1999) ("With the end of the Cold War, globalization is globalizing
Anglo-American-style capitalism ....It is globalizing American culture and cultural
icons. It is globalizing the best of America and the worst of America.").
114. ANDREA BASSANINI ET AL., KNOWLEDGE, TECHNOLOGY AND ECONOMIC
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the world in exports of information and information-based
115
technologies.
America has continued to stretch its technological lead.
Technology industries in the United States grew more than 10
percent a year from 1990 to 1997 "and accounted for about 40
percent of'the country's "total manufacturing labor productivity
growth" during that period. 116 Because measurable growth tends
to lag behind the introduction of new economies, 1 7 the economic
impact of the Internet and other technologies may not yet be
fully realized." 8 A long period of "sustained economic strength
with low inflation," however, supports a tentative assumption
that "the U.S. economy... [has] crossed into a new era of
greater economic prosperity and possibility, much as it did after
the development and spread of the electric dynamo and the
internal combustion engine." 119
Let us divide the socioeconomic terrain after globalization
according to the three broad categories of orchids: epiphytes,
lithophytes, and terrestrials. 120 In nature, terrestrial orchids live
as most other flowering plants, with roots in soil. Epiphytes grow
in trees; lithophytes, on rocks. By my parallel terminology,
terrestrials are industries bound by natural resources and
sedentary labor to a specific locale. Typically they make, grow, or
extract tangible goods. Under globalization, terrestrial industries
have ceded much economic Lebensraum to the epiphytic
information-based economy and even to the lithophytic economy of

GROWTH: RECENT EVIDENCE FROM OECD COUNTRIES 3 (2000).
115. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC

CO-OPERATION
AND
DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS FOR PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

RIGHTS EFFECTIVELY (1992) (reporting that such exports accounted for 67 percent of
United States exports, compared to 51 percent of Japanese exports and 44 percent of
German exports).
116. Id. at 14; see also Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, The Resurgence of
Growth in the Late 1990s: Is Information Technology the Story? 25, 27 (Federal
Reserve Bank, May 2000) (reporting that information and communications technology
accounted for 48 percent of overall labor productivity growth in the United States from
1991-95 and 56 percent from 1996-99). See generally Kevin Stiroh, Computers,
Productivity,and Input Substitution, 36 ECON. INQ. 175 (1998).
117. See Paul A. David, The Dynamo and the Computer: An HistoricalPerspective
on the Productivity Paradox, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 355, 356 (1990); Mehmet Yorukoglu,
The Information Technology Productivity Paradox, 1 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 551
(1998).
118. See BASSANINI ET AL., supra note 114, at 23.
119. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMIN., DIGITAL
ECONOMY 2000, at v (2000) availableat http://www.esa.doc.gov/de2000.pdf.
120. See ERIC HANSEN, ORCHID FEVER: A HORTICULTURAL TALE OF LOVE, LUST,
AND LUNACY 59 (2000).
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corrupt and illegal markets. Detached as they are from
earthbound nutrients, tree-dwelling epiphytes are the perfect
representation of an information-based economy severed from
local markets and from conventional, place-based factors of
production. Ideas, fashions, market share, and political dominance
rise and fall with blinding speed in the epiphytic economy.' 21 Real
epiphytes "aren't parasites - they give nothing to" their hosts
"and get nothing from [them] except a good place to sit."122 Though
the same could be said for real lithophytes, their preference for a
niche disdained by virtually all other flowering plants makes them
an apt embodiment of smugglers, thieves, and pirates. But the
economic world, like its natural counterpart, has limited space
and energy. At some point, success for one species comes at its
competitors' expense.
Globalization and Its Losers focused on the legitimate
epiphytic economy to the nearly complete exclusion of its shadowy
lithophytic counterpart. So do my critics' responses and this
defense. It is worth noting, however, that most protests against
globalization focus on multinational corporations and multilateral
international organizations, even though the recent expansion of
the underground economy and of international terrorism is
similarly attributable to globalization. 2 3 "Modern piracy" is "a
troubling symptom of a new world order, one shaped by a fierce
Darwinian struggle in the feral markets of modern international
trade." 24 Alone among my critics, Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn
indirectly blames globalization for the rise of "[m]ilitary
conflict... [as] a fact of daily life in vast quadrants of the
world." 125 In the larger community of globalization's antagonists,
hers is not the voice of critical consensus, but rather of lonely

121. See Eyal Benevenisti, Exit and Voice in the Age of Globalization,98 MICH. L.
REV. 167, 171-75 (1999); Dan L. Burk, Virtual Exit in the Global Information Economy,
73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 943 (1999); Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do,
104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1808-33 (1995).
122. SUSAN ORLEAN, THE ORCHID THIEF 48 (1998).
123. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 113, at 267-83 (describing phenomena such as the
rise of kleptocracy and robber baron capitalism in the former Soviet Union and the
emboldening of terrorists such as Osama bin Laden); cf. Michael A. Heller, The
Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111
HARV. L. REV. 621 (1998) (assigning blame for the stagnant Russian economy to the
flowering of rights to exclude, many of them corruptly acquired, after the fall of the
Soviet Union). See generally THE ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND ILLEGAL MARKETS
(Gianluca Fiorentini & Stefano Zamagni eds., 1999).
124. Jack Hitt, Bandits in the Global Shipping Lanes, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Aug.
20, 2000, at 36, 39.
125. Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 592.
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protest. By the strange moral code that drove the "Battle in
Seattle," Nike, McDonald's, and Microsoft are more objectionable
than the predators who ensnare eastern European women in the
global sex trade or exploit desperate emigres from China and
Mexico. These victims, too, are 'losers" in globalization's sweeping
drama. Though I regret that I have devoted little attention to their
fate, I must wonder how the usual critics of globalization would
respond to the massive and sometimes involuntary movement of
126
persons across borders.
But let us return to the task at hand. The epiphytic economy
undermines the social compact of the terrestrial nation-state. In a
1996 essay called "Fugitives and Agrarians in a World Without
Frontiers,"1 27 I described how an increasingly dominant "fugitive"
model of economic development would upset the regulatory and
redistributive premises of the conventional "agrarian" state. At
that time, I identified a few trends that would continue to favor
fugitive capital and intellectual resources over labor and
landlocked political power. Barriers to the movement of goods,
services, and persons will continue to lose their effectiveness, for
fugitive capital flees rapidly from excessive taxation and
regulation and even more decisively from catastrophic failures to
uphold the rule of law. Network effects, among other phenomena,
enhance the economic utility derived from large clumps of
consumers. 128 Efforts to preserve the global commons will collapse
in the absence of multilateral cooperation, for no one nation, much
less a single region, can comprehend even a single significant
sector of the economy within its regulatory embrace. 129 Four
additional years of globalization have solidified these
observations. From fugitives and agrarians to epiphytes and
terrestrials, nothing has changed but the metaphor. Whether
expressed in the lore of the literary South or the taxonomy of the
world's sexiest plants, 130 the message remains the same: No
126. See generally, e.g., ETNlCITY, CRIME, AND IMMIGRATION: COMPARATIVE AND
CROSS-NATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Michael Tonry ed., 1997); Margaret E. Montoya,
Border Crossings in an Age of Border Patrols: Cruzando FronterasMetaf6ricas, 26
N.M. L. REV. 1 (1996).
127. Jim Chen, Fugitives and Agrarians in a World Without Frontiers, 18
CARDOZO L. REV. 1031 (1996).
128. See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of
Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998).
129. Cf John H. Jackson, Reflections on InternationalEconomic Law, 17 U. PA. J.
INT'L ECON. L. 17, 24-25 (1996) ("[Given] the difficulty of government regulation of
international economic behavior... there is today hardly any subject that can be said
to be effectively controlled by a single national sovereign.").
130. The Fugitives and Agrarians were overlapping literary circles based in
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nation is an island.
More shocking than the scale of globalization is the pallor of
its opponents' response. Their counterattack so far consists of a
pair of potentially contradictory strategies: anarchy and autarky.
One branch of the antiglobalization movement evidently favors
vandalism and violent protest. Self-reliance and localism do not
necessarily follow from anarchy; the Unabomber affirmatively
favored "[I]ree trade agreements like NAFTA and GATT" because
"measures that tend to bind the world economy into a unified
whole" might make it "easier to destroy the industrial system on a
worldwide basis." 13 1 Perhaps we should defer a comprehensive
assessment of antiglobalist anarchy until its profit-seeking
counterpart, the lithophytic economy, commands our full
attention.
What concerns us, rather, is the solution that my critics
apparently prefer: a return to autarky. No one seriously defends
the cradle-to-grave welfare state anymore; capital flight and
transnational economic integration have all but eliminated that
strategy from the arsenal of the rational nation-state. 132 In its
place a chastened left has adopted a new strategy centered on
opposition to free trade. Effective trade barriers enable otherwise
uncompetitive local industries to mulct consumers for the benefit
of incumbent laborers. "If patriotism is ... the last refuge of the
scoundrel, wrapping outdated industry in the mantle of national
interest is the last refuge of the economically dispossessed." 33 No
other industry wears that mantle as thickly as agriculture.
Mindful of that dubious distinction, I now turn to the special
question of agriculture and agrarianism under globalization.
III. AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE IN THE POSTAGRARIAN SOCIETY
My critics unanimously endorse agriculture as a bulwark
against globalization's economic, environmental, and social ills.
Nashville during the early twentieth century. John Crowe Ransom, Donald Davidson,
Allen Tate, and Robert Penn Warren were prominent members of both groups. See
JOHN L. STEWART, THE BURDEN OF TIME: THE FUGITIVES AND AGRARiANS (1965);

Chen, supra note 127, at 1037-40.
131. IndustrialSociety and Its Future,supra note 111, 196.
132. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 113, at 86-87 (describing a "Golden Straitacket"
that commits governments to privatization, low inflation, price stability, free trade,
and elimination of barriers to direct foreign ownership and investment).
133. KENIcIu OHMAE, THE END OF THE NATION STATE: THE RISE OF REGIONAL
ECONOMIES 62 (1995).
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Each critic articulates a distinct agrarian rationale. Drawing
inspiration from the celebrated "environmentalist-farmer Wendell
Berry,"13 4 Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn embraces both environmental
protection and 1 full
employment under the common aegis of
"sustainability." 35 John Miller justifies protection of "a certain
minimum level of production" of foodstuffs and other "basic goods"
in the name of national "safety and security.1 36 Paul Thompson
expounds an elegant "neo-agrarian" political theory that
acknowledges and accommodates the "'special'... way in which
environmental impact and sense of community are so intimately
related to the means of [agricultural] production." 137 Finally,
self-sufficiency as the
Robert Wolf enshrines agricultural
138
foundation of his localist utopia.
This veneration of agriculture as antidote to industrial
maladies is deeply ironic. Historically speaking, agricultural
139
ascendancy has spawned inequality, even despotism.
Agriculture's more recent decline in economic and social
significance bears far less responsibility for contemporary
injustice. "[N]o single tool in human history [has] wreaked [as
much] havoc between women and men or stimulated so many
changes in human patterns of sex and love as the plow." 140 This

revolutionary invention sparked a social preference for men as
plowbearers and for sons as farm heirs that persists even in
today's post-agrarian societies. 141 It is but a short ecofeminist step
thence to recognizing "men's mistreatment and subordination of
women" as agents of "environmental despoliation.' 1 42 Thousands
134. See Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 591 & n.3 (invoking the anti-agribusiness
critique of "environmentalist-farmer Wendell Berry").
135. Id. at 593.
136. Miller, supra note 14, at 597.
137. Thompson, supra note 20, at 609.
138. See Wolf, supra note 25, at 620.
139. See JARED M. DIAMOND, THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE: THE EVOLUTION AND
FUTURE OF THE HUMAN ANIMAL 187-89 (1992). On the origins of Eurasian agriculture,
see generally ALBERT J. AMMERMAN & LUIGI L. CAVALLI-SFORZA, THE NEOLITHIC
TRANSITION AND THE GENETICS OF POPULATIONS IN EUROPE 9-33 (1984); SUSAN A.
GREGG, FORAGERS AND FARMERS: POPULATION INTERACTION AND AGRICULTURAL
EXPANSION IN PREHISTORIC EUROPE (1988); COLIN RENFREW, ARCHAEOLOGY AND
LANGUAGE: THE PUZZLE OF INDO-EUROPEAN ORIGINS 145-77 (1987).
140. See HELEN E. FISHER, ANATOMY OF LOVE: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF
MONOGAMY, ADULTERY, AND DIVORCE 278-79 (1992).
141. See DIAMOND, supra note 139, at 189-91.
142. Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph Sax's
Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the
Possibility of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1209, 1222 (1991). See generally JANET
BiEHL, RETHINKING ECOFEMINIST POLITICS (1991); ECOFEMINISM AND THE SACRED
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of years later, a lethally improved plow combined with the cotton
gin to whet early America's destructive appetite for slavery and
the sedentary
conquest. 143 Today's bourgeois masses populations that allegedly plunder rural regions for "the resources
never have arisen but
that urbanites need to survive" 144 - would
45
for the efficiency of Neolithic agriculture.
But I come to praise the bourgeoisie, not to bury it.146 In
mentioning bourgeois society, I intend merely to remind my
humanities-trained critics that the rise of the urban middle class
is the direct and inevitable historical consequence of the adoption
of agriculture. 47 The foot "soldiers in capitalist democracies" today
are "shufflers of paper," not tillers of the soil.148 To recognize such
bourgeois virtue not only undermines the agrarian critique of
globalization, but also rehabilitates economic integration across
borders as a safeguard of intangible freedoms. I shall now
examine the countervailing agrarian values promoted by my
critics - full employment, environmental protection, civic virtue
- and shall dismiss each of them in turn.

(Carol J. Adams ed., 1993); ECOFEMiNISM: WOMEN, ANIMALS, NATURE (Greta Gaard
ed., 1993); MARIA MiEs, ECOFEMINISM (1993); REWEAVING THE WORLD: THE
EMERGENCE OF ECOFEMINISM (Irene Diamond & Gloria Feman Orenstein eds., 1990).
143.

See WILLARD W. COCHRANE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN AGRICULTURE:

A HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 189-95 (1979).
144. Wolf, supra note 25, at 618.
145. See DIAMOND, supra note 98, at 104-13.
146. Cf Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 VAND. L. REV. 809, 875 (1995) ("We
need a bourgeois populism, a populism that reflects the values of the middle-class
masses whose consumer expenditures and tax payments have financed the American
Dream for farmers and factory workers alike.").
147. See Communist Manifesto, supra note 2, at 474-75.
148. D.N. McCloskey, Bourgeois Virtue, 63 AM. SCHOLAR 177, 177 (1994).
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149
HELP WANTED

The least overtly agrarian of my critics, Professor LaschQuinn is nevertheless the most honest herald of the economic
anxiety that fuels opposition to globalization. Jobs, she asserts,
are essential to "the sustainability of human beings
themselves."150 For her, as for so many others who value gains for
the disadvantaged over more than gains for the151relatively
prosperous, "unemployment is the economic problem."

But sustainability has nothing to do with full employment, a
distinct and often contradictory objective. Sustainability, properly
understood, is a strictly environmental concept. 152 "Sustainable

agriculture consists" solely of "processes involving biological
activities of growth or reproduction intended to produce crops,
which do not undermine our future capacity to successfully
153
practice agriculture" or "exhaust any irreplaceable resources."
The Convention on Biological Diversity likewise defines
"sustainable development" strictly as the "use of [natural
resources] in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-

term decline" of such resources, so that they will retain their

"potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future
generations." 54 These definitions satisfy what Paul Thompson has

149. Unless otherwise specified, employment statistics in this section are derived
from a memorandum by Nicole A. Saharsky (August 21, 2000) (on file with the
MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL TRADE). See also U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (104th-119th eds.,

1984-99) (detailing United States employment statistics) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT]; EUROPEAN COMM'N, THE AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN THE EUROPEAN

UNION: 1998 REPORT, at T/116 (1999) (detailing European Union agricultural
employment statistics) [hereinafter AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN EUROPE]; EUROPEAN
COMM'N, SITUATION AND OUTLOOK: RURAL DEVELOPMENTS 15 (1997) (same)
[hereinafter SITUATION AND OUTLOOK]; STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES, BASIC STRATEGIES OF THE COMMUNITY: COMPARISON WITH SOME

EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, CANADA, THE U.S.A., JAPAN, AND THE U.S.S.R. (21st-28th eds.,
1983-91) (detailing European Union non-agricultural employment statistics)
[hereinafter COMMSTAT]; STATISTICAL OFFICE OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BASIC
STATISTICS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: COMPARISON WITH THE PRINCIPAL PARTNERS OF

THE EUROPEAN UNION (31st-33d eds., 1994-96) (same) [hereinafter EUROSTAT].
150. Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 593.
151. Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions? Speculations on Law and
Macroeconomics,45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1224-25 (1993) (footnote omitted).
152. See Chen, supra note 3, at 197-98.
153. Hugh Lehman, E. Ann Clark & Stephan F. Weise, Clarifying the Definition of
SustainableAgriculture, 6 J. AGRIC. & ENvTL. ETHICS 127, 139 (1993).
154. 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development:
Convention on Biological Diversity, concluded at Rio de Janeiro, June 5, 1992, art. 2,
31 I.L.M. 818, 824 (1992).
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called "ecological sustainability," the use of "practice[s] ... that
do[ not violate or disrupt natural biological processes, especially
when biological processes are essential to renewal of the organic
materials necessary for life."15 5 As Professor Thompson has
acknowledged elsewhere, environmental sustainability is
conceptually distinct from "fairness, equity, justice and the other
15 6
central normative concepts for evaluating a given civilization."
To include human employment dilutes sustainability and exposes
it to the sort of interest-group capture that is the bane of true
15 7
environmental protection.
By contrast, the agrarian variant of sustainability makes a
fetish of work. It draws from a broader, left-of-center belief that
"work [is] the primary means by which ordinary people are
attached to civil society." 5 8 Wendell Berry says it most succinctly:
"The use only of our bodies" is what makes agriculture
environmentally sound and morally desirable. 1 9 One who does not
work the farm day to day is hardly a "real" farmer. 160 In endorsing
the agrarian work fetish, Professor Lasch-Quinn revives the old
Soviet distinction between the failure Western "bourgeois
constitution [alism]" which fails to "confirm any important
socioeconomic rights," and the Soviet legal system's protection of

155. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 189-90.
156. Id. at 196; cf id. At 195-96 (rejecting a right-leaning variant of social
sustainability because of its naive "faith that markets will continuously regenerate
profit incentives to ensure the production of food"). See generally PAUL B. THOMPSON,
THE SPIRIT OF THE SOIL: AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS (1995)
(examining and ultimately rejecting theories of sustainability that incorporate a social
dimension).
157. See Jim Chen, Get Green or Get Out: Decoupling Environmental from
Economic Objectives in AgriculturalRegulation, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 333, 338 (1995); Jim
Chen, The Agroecological Opium of the Masses, 10:4 CHOICES 16, 16 (Winter 1995); cf
Doremus, supra note 48, at 64 ("The problem with the sustainable development
concept is that it is subject to a variety of interpretations ....
[especially by]
[elconomists and ecologists.").
158. Joel F. Chandler, QuestionsAbout Social Europe by an American Observer, 18
WIS. INT'L L.J. 437, 439-40 (2000).
159. WENDELL BERRY, THE HIDDEN WOuND 8 (2d ed. 1989); WENDELL BERRY,
WHAT ARE PEOPLE FOR? 72 (1990).
160. See Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., 610 N.W.2d 420, 428 (Neb. 2000) (requiring
that at least one shareholder of a family farm or ranch corporation "be involved on a
daily or routine basis in all aspects of the farm or ranch activities," either in "the
physical chores attendant to the farm" or in "the mental and business activities of the
operation"); see also Pig Pro Nonstock Co-op. v. Moore, 568 N.W.2d 217, 228 (Neb.
1997) (rationalizing the requirement of daily involvement in farm labor or
management as a way of preventing "absentee ownership and operation of farm and
ranch land by a corporate entity").
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"the right to work."1 61 By declaring that "[a]nyone who wants to
farm should be free to do so," American agrarianism has
incorporated a less overtly socialist version of this creed.162
American agricultural policy historically "has treated agricultural
1 63
entrepreneurship - as the economic refuge of the scoundrel."
Agrarians routinely defend agriculture as a bastion against
unemployment, especially toward the lower end of the skill
spectrum. Jim Hightower has reputedly touted farming as one of
the few high-wage professions in the Untied States still open to
someone without a college degree. As the former agriculture
commissioner of Texas might say, "You don't need a P-h-D to do
the j-o-b."
Pity that none of this is true. We need not even disturb the
dubious assumption that unskilled workers can succeed as ownermanagers in an industry as technologically intense as First World
agriculture.1 6 4 In an epiphytic economy, agriculture's impact on
161. I.S. STEPNOVA, TIME, EVENTS, PEOPLE 103 (1983) (an "English teacher's
book" designed for use in Soviet schools). See generally HAROLD J. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN
THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE SOVIET LAW (rev. ed. 1963).
162. DON PAARLBERG, FARM AND FOOD POLICY: ISSUES OF THE 1980S, at 7 (1980);
DON PAARLBERG, AMERICAN FARM POLICY 3 (1964); see also Neil D. Hamilton,
Agriculture Without Farmers: Is Industrialization Restructuring American Food
Production and Threatening the Future of SustainableAgriculture?, 14 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 613, 639 (1994) (restating the agrarian creed as a declaration of financial and
managerial independence for farmers). The following statement of the farmers'
'catechism" proved worthy of a Pulitzer Prize:
What is a farmer?
A farmer is a man who feeds the world.
What is a farmer's first duty?
To grow more food.
What is a farmer's second duty?
To buy more land.
What are the signs of a good farm?
Clean fields, neatly painted buildings, breakfast at six, no debts, no
standing water.
How will you know a good farmer when you meet him?
He will not ask you for any favors.
JANE SMILEY, A THOUSAND ACRES 45 (1991).
163. Jim Chen & Edward S. Adams, Feudalism Unmodified: Discourseson Farms
and Firms,45 DRAKE L. REV. 361, 390 (1997).
164. In point of fact, they can't. See, e.g., Hank Becker & Dennis Senif, Satellites
Key to New Farming Aids, AGRIC. RESEARCH, Feb. 1992, at 4; Grant Mangold, Yield
Monitors and PrecisionFarmingSystem Integrators, SUCCESSFUL FARMING, May-June
1996, at 37; Matthew McManus, Satellite Mapping Reaps Higher Crop Yields, MACH.
DESIGN, Mar. 21, 1996, at 54; Kathryn Barry Stelljes, IPM Targets Grasshoppers,
AGRIc. RESEARCH, Jan. 1996, at 4 (describing the "sophisticated technologies" used to
track "the number and life cycles" of insect pests); Survival Kits: How Farming Is
Reinventing Itself, ECONOMIST, Mar. 25, 2000, at 6; Poor Relations: Are Third-World
Commodity ProducersCondemned to Eternal Poverty?, ECONOMIST, Apr. 16, 1994, at
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overall employment is negligible. In my relatively brief lifetime,
agricultural employment in the United States has declined below
total unemployment. 165 This demographic crossover point rivals
the famed 1920 census, the first to count more urban than rural

residents. 166 Indeed, even in the 1990s, a period of historically low
unemployment in the United States, 167 agricultural employment
(2.7

percent)

has

been

roughly

half the

total

level

of

unemployment (5.9 percent). 168 All of this "extraordinary
prosperity" has occurred despite the United States' "constant
trade deficits," a "paradox" that globalization's critics have yet to
explain.169

The European situation reinforces rather than negates
agriculture's economic irrelevance in a post-agrarian society.

Despite higher population density and less acreage under
cultivation, 170 the European Union has famously propped up
76 (considering the use of future contracts, options, and hedging to decrease market
risk). For an overview of the global impact of information technologies on agriculture,
see UNITED NATIONS, FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS,

THE STATE OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE 1996, at 57-70 (1996) [hereinafter FAO 1996
REPORT].

165. See Vernon W. Ruttan, AgriculturalPolicy in an Affluent Society, 48 J. FARM
ECON. 1100, 1101 (1966). Professor Ruttan's watershed article was published in the
year of my birth. The employment data he used are obsolete, of course, but
contemporary market conditions reinforce rather than undermine his insights. His
core technique of comparing agricultural employment to total unemployment retains
its vigor. Suffice it to say that an "entire generation" and a half have "come of age"
since his wisdom became available to anyone who would heed it. Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).
166. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1 FOURTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES
43 (1921) (reporting that urban residents outnumbered rural residents 51.4 percent to
48.6 percent).
167. See Steven Greenhouse, Foreign Workers at Highest Level in Seven Decades,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 2000, at Al (reporting that the current 4 percent unemployment
rate is nearly the lowest in four decades).
168. From 1990 to 1998, agricultural employment in the United States held
constant between 2.6 and 2.8 percent of the workforce. Total unemployment in the
same period averaged 5.9 percent, with a high of 7.5 percent in 1992, a low of 4.5
percent in 1998, and a standard deviation of .93 percent over the nine-year period. For
the derivation of these employment statistics and others reported in this article, see
supra note 149.
169. Robert J. Samuelson, Trade Free or Die: Pat Buchanan and the Illusions of
Protectionism,218 NEw REPUB., June 22, 1998, at 27; see also Bruce Stokes, Anybody
Notice the Trade Deficit?, 31 NATL J. 2383 (Aug. 14, 1999).
170. Based on population figures for 1997, the population density of the European
Union was 115 inhabitants per square kilometer, almost four times the United States'
population density of 29 inhabitants per square kilometer. At the same time, 134
million hectares were under cultivation in European Union, less than a third of the
425 million hectares cultivated in the United States. See AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN
EUROPE, supra note 149, at T/23-T/24.
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agricultural employment to double the American rate. 171 With an
average farm size of 17.4 hectares, Europe comes far closer to the
"family farm" ideal than the United States, where the average
farm contains 206.7 hectares. 172 But overall employment prospects
are rosier by far in the United States. From 1983 to 1995,
European unemployment averaged 10.1 percent, one and a half
times the 6.7 percent rate in the United States over the same
period. 173 Even more remarkably, the United States has beaten
Europe not only in achieving a higher level of employment, but
also in maintaining a lower level of inflation. Every year from
1986 to 1995, the consumer price index based on the same market
74
basket of goods was lower in the United States than in Europe.
Numbers alone, however, vastly understate the depth of

171. From 1990 to 1997, agricultural employment in the European Union
averaged 5.6 percent. See supra note 149. Figures for 1998 were not available. For an
explanation of the economic, social, and environmental rationales underlying
European
agricultural
policy, see
EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
AGRICULTURE,
ENVIRONMENT, RURAL DEVELOPMENT: FACTS AND FIGURES: A CHALLENGE FOR
AGRICULTURE 39-49 (1999) [hereinafter EUROPEAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT].
172. See AGRICULTURAL SITUATION IN EUROPE, supra note 149, at T/24. On the
other hand, sharecropping and tenant farming, those twin incidents of feudal
agriculture, are much more common in Europe than in the United States. Compare
MINISTRRE DE L'AGRICULTURE ET DE LA P CHE, GRAPH AGRI FRANCE 94, at 13 (1994)
(reporting that tenants and sharecroppers outnumbered freehold farmers in France by
a margin of 54 to 46 percent) with STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (119th ed. 1999), supra note
149, at 675 (reporting tenancy rates no higher than 11.5 percent in American
agriculture from 1987 to 1997 and full-ownership rates as high as 60.0 percent over
the same period). See generally Chen & Adams, supra note 163, at 377-85 (describing
the symbolic significance of farm tenancy in Europe and the United States).
173. See supra note 149.
174. See COMMSTAT (28th ed. 1991), supra note 149, at 90-91; EUROSTAT (33d ed.
1996), supra note 149, at 110. The statistics for Europe from 1986 through 1990 are
based on a Union of twelve member-states; only the later figures include Austria,
Finland, and Sweden. As of 1995, the last year for which comparative statistics are
readily available, the European consumer price index stood at 148 on a scale in which
1985 prices represent 100. The corresponding U.S. consumer price index for 1995 stood
at 142. Over the ten-year period that bridged 1985 to 1995, the European index rose an
average of 4.00 percent each year, while the American index rose an average of 3.57
percent each year.
Two technical notes are in order. First, one should note that rates of inflation
over time or anything else purporting to measure inflation cannot be
computed arithmetically (i.e., via simple division of the change in the consumer price
index by the number of years elapsed). It is necessary to apply a formula reflecting
the geometric compounding of prices. In this instance, I subtracted 1 from the 10th
root of each price index in 1995 divided by the 1985 base of 100. Second, consumer
price indexes, being based on a fixed market basket and incapable of reflecting
changes in consumer behavior over time, systematically overstate inflation. See U.S.
DEP'T OF LABOR, UNDERSTANDING THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX: ANSWERS TO SOME

QUESTIONS (1997).
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European unemployment. 175 In 1989, forty percent of Europe's

unemployed, as opposed to 5.7 percent of the unemployed in
America, stayed jobless for more than a year. 176 Most of the
chronically unemployed are workers in their prime working
years. 177 Unemployment in Europe devastates the young, even the

university-educated. 7 8 Today's Europeans are unfamiliar with the
sinecures that their forebears enjoyed in the middle of the
twentieth century. Nearly a fifth of Europeans who are between

the ages of 15 and 24 and not enrolled in school hold "insecure
jobs." 179 In Sweden and Finland, that figure is a one-third; in

Spain, nearly two-thirds.1 8 0 Jim Hightower articulates widespread
discontent over the job prospects of young Americans: "Already,
America has millions of people who are overeducated for the jobs
they have. Chances are [the] waitress who has three of Bill
Clinton's new jobs also has a college degree." 18 Thanks to
European labor policy, however, the American waitress mom's
French or German counterpart could readily have three college

degrees and no job.
In Europe or America, the crucial ratio remains that of
agricultural employment to overall unemployment. Once "the

level of farm employment" falls below "unemployment in the rest
175. See generally ROBERT SOLOW, Is ALL THAT EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT
NECESSARY? (MIT World Economy Laboratory, Working Paper No. 94-06, 1994).
176. See Katherine McFate, Introduction: Western States in the New World Order,
in POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY 1, 5-6 (Katherine
McFate et al. eds., 1995).
177. See id.; Joel Handler, The "Third Way" or the Old Way?, 48 KAN. L. REV. 765,
766-67 (2000).
178. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, THE EUROPEAN UNION: KEY FIGURES 21 (1997)
(reporting an unemployment rate of 20.8 percent among persons younger than 25,
compared with 12.5 percent in the United States); EUROPEAN COMMISSION, EUROSTAT
YEARBOOK: A STATISTICAL EYE ON EUROPE: DATA 1987-1997, at 121 (1999) (reporting
that high school and university graduates aged 25-29 suffered roughly equal rates of
unemployment, between 11 and 12 percent). See generally Katherine McFate,
Trampolines, Safety Nets, or Free Fall?Labor Market Policies and Social Assistance in
the 1980s, in POVERTY, INEQUALITY, AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL POLICY, supra note
176, at 631 (describing the impact of European unemployment on the young). I can
offer a tangentially relevant anecdote. During recent academic visits in France and
Germany, I readily acquired the words chomage and Arbeitslosigkeit and used them
regularly. My European counterparts, by contrast, rarely if ever deployed the word
unemployment in English-language discussions of the United States, except to note its
relative rarity. On the legal significance of foreign language learning, see generally
Jim Chen, Law as a Species of LanguageAcquisition, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1263 (1995).
179. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, KEY DATA ON EDUCATION IN EUROPE 9 (2000).
180. See id. (reporting that 35 percent rate of young Swedes, 37 percent of young
Finns, and 65 percent of young Spaniards hold insecure jobs).
181. Jim Hightower, From the Bank to the Cleaners, TEX. OBSERVER, Dec. 10,
1999, availableat http://www.texasobserver.org/archives.
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of the economy even during periods of high-level economic activity,
there is no longer any question of the capacity of the nonfarm
sector to absorb displaced farm workers."18 2 On both sides of the
north Atlantic alliance, on-farm employment has remained half of
total unemployment. In the developed world, rural prosperity no
longer depends on agriculture. 8 3 Farm advocates are alarmed
because many farmers have taken off-farm jobs in order "to obtain
health insurance benefits.., or to supplement... family
income."18 4 From a broader perspective, a shift to multiple earners
and multiple sources of income hardly constitutes a crisis. So
thoroughly have we decoupled the rural economy and the overall
economy from agriculture that the primary significance of on-farm
employment is political. Romance, not reason, explains why "each
new agricultural census" spurs "frantic efforts ...

to prove that

regardless of whatever else we still have a 'family' farm
85
economy."
The ramifications for trade policy are profound. Protecting
First World agriculture from international competition cannot be
justified as a relief valve for unemployed and underemployed
workers. Its primary effect is to sever the developing world from
the developed North's lucrative markets. Of all places, Europe
should understand the material and political perils of autarky.
The twentieth century witnessed mass death across Europe, first
from famine after the Soviet Union's disastrous experiment with
forced collectivization, 8 6 then from war and genocide traceable in
no small part to the simultaneous erection of trade barriers across
the industrialized world. 87 With dramatically lower stakes,
182. Ruttan, supra note 165, at 1115.
183. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, supra note 149, at 15 (1997) ("Agriculture and
forestry no longer form the backbone of rural economies throughout the [European
Union]."); Ruttan, supra note 165, at 1116 ("A prosperous agriculture no longer implies
a prosperous rural community."). See generally Bruce Gardner, Demythologing Farm
Income, CHOICES, 1st Q. 1993, at 22 (demonstrating that farmers are relying less on
agricultural income).
184. Terence P. Stewart, Trade and Cattle:How the System Is Failingan Industry
in Crisis,9 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 449,476 (2000).
185. Ruttan, supra note 165, at 1115; see also WILLARD W. COCHRANE & C. FORD
RUNGE, REFORMING FARM POLICY: TOWARD A NATIONAL AGENDA 21 (1992) (arguing
that much of what passes for agricultural policy in the United States rests on an
unrealistic "soft-focus view of rural life").
186. Cf R.G. Tugwell, The Principle of Planning and the Institution of Laissez
Faire, 22 (supp.) AM. ECON. REv. 75, 76, 91 (1932) (envisioning a "future [that was]
becoming visible in Russia" during the 1930s: a planned paradise based on "the
abandonment... of laissez faire" and "the abolition of 'business').
187. See Jim Chen, Filburn's ForgottenFootnote - OfFarm Team Federalismand
Its Fate, 82 MINN. L. REV. 249, 289, 294-95 (1997).
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Europe today keeps tinkering with agricultural markets. The
European Union's most notorious import preference, fashioned for
bananas from former colonies in Africa, 88 gouges consumers and
encourages growers to harvest bananas without regard to the
actual balance between market price and resource cost.
Other excuses for agricultural autarky also fail. National food
security, the rationale that John Miller proffers, provides no cover
for the United States and the other food-exporting powerhouses of
the developed world. The United States emerged from World War
II with so much surplus agricultural capacity that it has been
feeding the rest of the world ever since. Congressional "findings"
that understate "the ability of the United States to produce food
and fiber in sufficient quantities" defy credibility.1 8 9 Rather,
perennial agricultural surpluses give the United States a
regulatory challenge at home and political opportunities abroad. 190
Public Law 480, America's premier food aid statute,1 91 was
intended not only to relieve pressure on federal price and income
support programs, but also to export prosperity and capitalism. 92
Though this aid scarcely benefited its foreign recipients,1 93 Public
188. See World Trade Organization, European Communities - Regime for the
Importation, Sale & Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS227/RIUSA (May 22, 1997). See
generally, e.g., Zsolt K. Bessko, Going Bananas over EEC Preferences?:A Look at the
Banana Trade War and the WTO's Understandingon Rules and ProceduresGoverning
the Settlement of Disputes, 28 CASE W. RES. J. INVL L. 265 (1996); Chi Carmody, Of
Substantial Interest: Third Parties Under GATT, 18 MICH. J. IN'L L. 615 (1997);
Richard Lyons, European Union Banana Controversy, 9 FLA. J. INT'L L. 165 (1994);
Inger Osterdahl, Bananas and Treaty-Making Powers: Current Issues in the External
Trade Law of the European Union, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 473 (1997); Rodrigo
Bustamante, Note, The Need for a GATT Doctrine of Locus Standi" Why the United
States Cannot Stand the European Community's Banana Import Regime, 6 MINN. J.
GLOBAL TRADE 533 (1997); Jack J. Chen, Note, Going Bananas: How the WTO Can
Heal the Split in the Global Banana Trade Dispute, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1283 (1995);
cf Michelle Williams, Comment, Caribbean Shiprider Agreements: Sunk by Banana
Trade War?, 31 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 163 (2000) (alleging that Europe's failure
to accede in hostile WTO decisions over the banana controversy has enhanced the
Caribbean drug trade).
189. Farmland Protection Policy Act, § 1(a)(3), 7 U.S.C. § 4201(a)(3) (1994).
190. See generally Vernon W. Ruttan, The Politics of U.S. Food Aid Policy: A
HistoricalReview, in WHY FOOD AID? 2 (Vernon W. Ruttan ed. 1993).
191. Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 480,
68 Stat. 454 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
192. See Willard W. Cochrane, Farm Technology, Foreign Surplus Disposal, and
Domestic Supply Control, 41 J. FARM ECON. 885 (1959), reprinted in WHY FOOD AID?,
supra note 190, at 39; Mordecai Ezekiel, Apparent Results in Using Surplus Food for
FinancingEconomic Development, 40 J. FARM ECON. 915 (1958).
193. See Theodore W. Schultz, Value of U.S. Farm Surpluses to Underdeveloped
Countries, 42 J. FARM EcON. 1019 (1960), reprintedin WHY FOOD AID?, supra note 190,
at 53.
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Law 480 converted domestic agricultural surpluses into one of the
leading foreign policy instruments of the Cold War. 194 The
superficially charitable slogan "food for peace" obscured fiscal
waste and collateral damage to agricultural self-sufficiency in
recipient countries. 195 (Those problems, of course, are the very
albatrosses that globalization's most vocal critics have
tried to
196
hang from the necks of the IMF and the World Bank.)
Further elaboration of American food aid policy would
obscure the essential point.1 97 Only a nation that is obscenely rich
by the West's historical standards and the larger world's
contemporary standards can indulge in food aid either as a means
of suppressing domestic supplies or as a tool for shaping foreign
relations, much less both. From the perspective of the First World,
where nuclear war is a more salient threat than mass starvation,
food security contributes less to trade policy than to military
strategy.1 98 By contrast, in those corners of the globe where the
ghost of Malthus still walks,1 99 protectionist undercurrents in the
agricultural policies of food-exporting nations destabilize the
already precarious state of food security.
Nor does any succor lie in recharacterizing agriculture as a
"multifunctional" activity, as Paul Thompson and the European
Union would prefer. 200 It is simply not true, as Professor
Thompson claims, that "[c]omparative figures" contrasting the
environmental performance of American and European
agriculture "are not readily available."201 Greater pollution and
194. See Food for Peace Act of 1966, Pub L. No. 89-808, § 2(A), (B), 80 Stat. 1526,
1526-28 (declaring a policy of "us[ing] the abundant agricultural productivity of the
United States... to promote the foreign policy of the United States," including a
condition that countries receiving American food aid be "friendly" and "independent of
domination or control by any world Communist movement") (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. §§ 1691, 1701, 1703). See generally Ruttan, supra note 190, at 9-26.
195. See Emma Rothschild, Is It Time to End Food for Peace?, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
Mar. 13, 1977, at 15, reprinted in WHY FOOD AID?, supra note 190, at 84.
196. See, e.g., Michael H. Shuman, GATTzilla v. Communities, 27 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 527, 537-39 (1994); Wolf, supra note 25, at 613-14 & n.7.
197. For a summary of the United States' current food aid policy, see Federal
Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, §§ 201, 203,
110 Stat. 888, 951-953 (amending 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691a, 1702). See generally Vernon W.
Ruttan, Does Food Aid Have a Future?,80 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 572 (1998).
198. See generally PAUL B. THOMPSON, THE ETHICS OF AID AND TRADE: U.S. FOOD
POLICY, FOREIGN COMPETITION, AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 20-40 (1992) (analyzing
the United States' geopolitical use of the "food weapon" during the Cold War).
199. See infra text accompanying notes 232-236.
200. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 605-06, 609.
201. Id. at 606 n.9; see, e.g., C. FORD RUNGE, FREER TRADE, PROTECTED
ENVIRONMENT: BALANCING TRADE LIBERALIZATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL INTERESTS
46-47 (1994) (attributing Europe's higher levels of excess soil nitrogen to the European
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soil erosion are part of "the price paid for the [food that
Europeans] eat."20 2 Even the "mad cow" scare of the mid-1990s
was partly attributable to the traditional practices of British cattle
producers, those supposedly superior stewards whose protection
has motivated Europe to exclude hormone-fed beef from the
United States. 20 3 The much vaunted 1992 reform of Europe's
Common Agricultural Policy 20 4 authorized agricultural subsidies
on the dubious rationale that continued cultivation "promote [s] ...
the upkeep of abandoned farmland," reduces "natural hazards and
fire risks, and... avert[s] the dangers associated with the
depopulation of rural areas." 205 On occasion the European
Commission comes closer to admitting the real rationale behind
its agroecological policy: subsidizing continued cultivation in the
name of preserving "cultural landscapes" whose primary value lies
in the aesthetic 20pleasure
of their "semi-natural habitats" and
"scenic features." 6 On meatier matters such as pollution control,
the fragmentation and inconsistent application of European
environmental law suggests that European federalism has not yet
matured. 20 7 The European Union's pathetic environmental
performance demonstrates the pernicious "agroecological fallacy"
208
of equating agriculture with environmental protection.

Union's agricultural subsidies); cf Gordon C. Rausser & David Nielson, Looking
Ahead: Agricultural Policy in the 1990s, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 415, 420-21 (1990)
(noting that agricultural subsidies encourage farmers to consume natural resources at
unsustainable rates). See generally EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY, EUROPE'S

ENVIRONMENT: THE DOBJ8 ASSESSMENT 447-63 (David Stanners & Philippe Bourdeau
eds., 1995) (describing the environmental profile of European agriculture); EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL AGENCY, EUROPE'S ENVIRONMENT: THE SECOND ASSESSMENT 164-67,
184, 198-200, 241, 281-82 (documenting the impact of European agriculture on
biodiversity, water use, phosphorous and nitrogen pollution of the soil, and soil
erosion).
202. VOLTAIRE, Candide, or Optimism, in CANDIDE AND OTHER WRITINGS 110, 152
(Hasket M. Block ed., 1956).
203. See Report of the Appellate Body, World Trade Org., European Community
Measures Concerning Meat & Meat Prods. (Hormones), AB-1997-4, WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) available at http://www.wto.org; Dale E. McNiel, The
First Case Under the WTO's Sanitary and PhytosanitaryAgreement: The European
Union's Hormone Ban, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 89 (1998); Michele D. Carter, Note, Selling
Science Under the SPS Agreement: Accommodating Consumer Preferences in the
Growth Hormones Controversy, 6 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 625 (1997).
204. See Council Reg. 92/2078/EEC, O.J. L 215 (July 30, 1992) available at
www.wto.org.
205. EUROPEAN RURAL DEVELOPMENT, supra note 171, at 47.
206. SITUATION AND OUTLOOK, supra note 183, at 18-19.
207. See Damian Chalmers, Inhabitants in the Field of European Community
EnvironmentalLaw, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 39 (1999).
208. See generally Chen, Get Green or Get Out, supra note 157, at 343-50.
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UP FROM AGRICULTURE

Multifunctional agriculture, however, transcends mere
economic and environmental significance for Professor Thompson.
It lies at the heart of his philosophical case for agrarianism as a
political palladium against "actions that concentrate land
holdings, or that skew economic development toward wealth that
is vulnerable to capital flight."20 9 The "agrarian meme," he argues,
might be worth preserving wherever the dream of democratic
statecraft remains unfulfilled.2 10 The logical extension of this
argument deifies agrarianism as a core freedom, a political
commitment worthy of being enshrined in fundamental law so
that other freedoms dependent upon it may be protected. 211 In the
European political parlance Professor Thompson evidently favors,
agrarianism belongs in the metaclass of "social rights" that
facilitate the exercise of "civil rights" (such as property ownership
and contract formation) and of "political rights" (such as the
212
franchise).
But Professor Thompson wisely limits his claim to "the early
stages of state formation." 213 He concedes that "[c]lassical agrarian

claims are less plausible in states where democratic institutions
have taken root and where relatively few people participate in
food production." 214 Those are precisely the characteristics of
agriculture in Europe and the United States, the First World
arenas where much of the agrarian outrage at globalization has
been directed. In developed economies, the primary expression of
the agrarian meme is rent-seeking on behalf of well organized
farm entrepreneurs. 2 5 The severing of most voters and consumers
209. Thompson, supra note 20, at 608.
210. Id.
211. See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 728 (1971)
("[without an informed and free press there cannot be an enlightened people")
(Stewart, J., concurring); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("[tlhe
constitutional right of free expression is powerful in a society as diverse and populous
as ours"); cf Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937-38 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (speculating whether the second amendment to the United States
Constitution, source of the infamous right to "keep and bear arms," U.S. CONST. amdt.
II, should be vigorously enforced '"as the palladium of liberties of a republic" (citing 3
JOSEPH STORY, COm.MENTARIES § 1890, at 746 (1833))).
212. See T.H. MARSHALL, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS 10-27 (1950).
213. Thompson, supra note 20, at 608.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at the Dawn of the Special Interest
State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77 CAL. L. REV. 83 (1989); Geoffrey P.
Miller, The True Story of CaroleneProducts, 1987 Sup. CT. REv. 397 (1987); Katherine
E. Monahan, U.S. Sugar Policy: Domestic and International Repercussions of Sour
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from the daily demands of food production cripples the usual
modes of political self-defense, for an agriculturally illiterate
society hardly stands a chance against lobbyists who have
cultivated the congressional contacts and mastered all the
216
rhetorical moves.
By Professor Thompson's implicit admission, the agrarian
meme has lingered well past its expiration date. And because
founding ideologies can embed themselves in political markets,
much as early technologies can block the adoption of later,
improved technologies, 217 the United States and other mature
democracies now pay for agrarianism in the form of ideological
lock-in. A quintessentially "terrestrial" industry, agriculture is
extremely vulnerable to the changes that accompany the
emergence of an epiphytic, information-driven economy. 218 In any
industry as "mature" as First World agriculture, "most of the
technical aspects of production have been standardized,.., the
nature of demand is well known," and the cost of doing business
"over geographic space becomes trivial."21 9 As "[t]he production of
things has become steadily cheaper," as industrialization and
globalization accelerate the substitution of other inputs for labor,
"the farmer's share in employment" necessarily falls "towards
industry whose
nil."220 As a result, agriculture is perhaps the only
221
technology policy consists of knee-jerk rejection.
Virtually every other industry defines success according to
profit and technological advance. By contrast, even though
defining agriculture according to the "ownership of land has no
economic or legal validity,"222 agrarianism still measures success
Law, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 325 (1992).

216. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING AGRICULTURE:
NEW DIRECTIONS FOR EDUCATION (1988) (documenting how little most Americans
know about agriculture, its social and economic significance, and its links to human
health and environmental quality); Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding Our Future: Six
Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 211 (1993)
(identifying and lamenting agricultural illiteracy).
217. See generally Lemley & McGowan, supra note 128, at 495-500 (reviewing the
economic literature).
218. See PETER H. LINDERT, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 70-71 (9th ed. 1991)
(observing that trade liberalization and deregulation will inflict short-run losses on
immobile sectors lacking a comparative advantage in global markets).
219. David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman, Innovating Clusters and the
Industry Life Cycle, 11 REV. INDUS. OR. 253, 259 (1996); accord Ronald J. Gilson, The
Legal Infrastructureof High Tech Industrial Districts:Silicon Valley, Route 128, and
CovenantsNot to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 585 (1999).
220. McCloskey, supra note 148, at 178.
221. See Chen, Agroecological Opium, supra note 157, at 20.
222. National Broiler Marketing Ass'n v. United States, 436 U.S. 816, 847 (1978)
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according to stability in land ownership and entrepreneurial
employment.22 3 As long ago as 1926, Bertrand Russell condemned
agriculture's reliance on the "social and hereditary principle" 224
of
occupational selection as "a deplorable waste of talent."
Economic rationality alone cannot explain agrarianism's deep and
enduring Luddite streak, for economies of scale in farming are
actually quite low. 225 The explanation lies in ideological lockjaw.
Driven by agrarian preferences in favor of "wide distribut[ion]" of
"land holdings" and against "wealth that is vulnerable to capital
flight,"226 agriculture exudes open hostility to "newcomers": "New
capital, new farmers, new ideas - nothing alien to the farming
tradition as incumbent landowners know it need apply .... -227
Notorious static in its orientation, agrarianism can neither
accommodate nor facilitate dynamic efficiency, whether stated in
of economic or environmental. Agrarianism's stifling prominence
in the prevailing critique of globalization obscures the nature and
developmental significance of technological change. Firms
typically innovate through "continuous interactive learning," "both
from their own experience of design, development, production and
marketing... and from a wide variety of external sources." 228 In
an information-driven economy, "efficient creation of new works"
and "dynamic market efficiency over different generations" hinge
on "access to and use of old works."229 The pursuit of "temporary
monopoly profits" based on "technological innovation" has
arguably served as the primary spur for "the tremendous growth
of the Western economies." 230 Globalization of its own force
(White, J., dissenting). Contra, e.g., MARTY STRANGE, FAMILY FARMING: A NEW
ECONOMIC VISION 43-55 (1988) (treating "land" as "the central issue" in the economic
struggle between family farming and industrialized agribusiness).
223. See SMILEY, supra note 162, at 5.
224. BERTRAND RUSSELL, EDUCATION AND THE GOOD LIFE 306 (1926).
225. See Nancy L. Johnson & Vernon W. Ruttan, Why Are Farms So Small?, 22
WORLD DEV. 691, 702 (1994).
226. Thompson, supra note 20, at 608.
227. Chen, supra note 146, at 827.
228. Christopher Freeman, The Economics of Technical Change, 18 CAMB. J.
ECON. 463, 470 (1994) (emphasis in original); see also NELSON & WINTER, supra note
81, at 351 (noting that innovative opportunities within some industries tend to stem
from outside sources).
229. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual PropertyLaw,
75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 997 (1997); cf BASSANINI ET AL., supra note 114, at 26 (describing
information and communications technologies not only as "the result of a continuous
innovative process, but also [as] ... a tool for further innovation in the productive
processes of other sectors").
230. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 805, 843 (1988). The precise impact of
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induces even more innovation insofar as the lifting of trade
restraints "may increase the size of the market considered by
inventors" and thereby stimulate inventiveness "in economies
with small domestic markets." 231 The failure to engage the global
economy casts its own shadow on the future, for losses in dynamic
efficiency are as cumulative as gains.
Reflexive resistance to agricultural technology, especially
advanced transgenic techniques, poses a special threat to the
developing nations where Professor Thompson would preserve the
agrarian meme. Before imposing the romantic and thoroughly
Western ideology "that technology alienates man from both the
natural world and from the natural community," perhaps we
should ask "the Taiwanese farmer [who] harvests" rice at three
times the yield realized by the previous generation whether he
"feels a greater alienation than his father." 232 Annual increases in
agricultural productivity of less than one percent will hardly keep
pace with one to two percent annual increases in global demand,
much less the three to five percent annual increases that the least
developed countries will experience. 233 Though many antitrade
activists at the Battle in Seattle advocated a return to "locally
produced goods, including food, the hard truth is that developing
countries need freer trade to feed themselves." 234 "Despite a ten
percent increase in per capita food availability in most developing
countries" from 1995 to 2020, "135 million children under the age

market structure on innovation is an extraordinarily complex and hotly contested
subject. Compare SCHUMPETER, supra note 109, at 87-106 (arguing that monopoly
spurs greater inventiveness) with Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the
Allocation of Resources to Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE
ACTIVITY 609 (National Bureau of Economic Research ed., 1962) (according this
distinction to a competitive rather than monopolistic market), reprinted in 5
COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROW: PRODUCTION AND CAPITAL 104 (Belknap
ed., 1985). Needless to say, it lies beyond the scope of this essay.
231. NEW ECONOMY, supra note 112, at 17.
232. Vernon W. Ruttan, Agricultural Scientists as Reluctant Revolutionaries, 7
INTERDISC. SCI. REvs. 170, 175 (1982).
233. See Vernon W. Ruttan, SustainabilityIs Not Enough, 3 AM. J. ALTERNATIVE
AGTRIC. 128, 129 (1988); cf UNITED NATIONS, FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION,
WORLD AGRICULTURE: TOWARDS 2010, at 78-82 (1995) (predicting that global growth
in gross agricultural production will barely meet growth in demand, with both
projected to increase 1.8 percent annually from 1988/90 through 2010). See generally
FAO 1996 REPORT, supra note 164, at 261-321 (examining macroeconomic factors
affecting global food security); Luther Tweeten, Dodging a Malthusian Bullet in the
2
1st Century, 14 AGRIBUSINESS 15 (1998) (assessing the prospects for global food
security in the next 100 years).
234. C. Ford Runge & Benjamin Senauer, A Removable Feast, FOREIGN AFF.,
May/June 2000, at 39, 41.
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of 5 are projected to remain hungry in 2020."235 The naive slogan,
"We must cultivate our garden," alleviates none of these grim
236
prospects.
Meanwhile, First World agrarianism steadfastly "opposes the
vertical integration of industries."237 Even at home, where the
human consequences of their ideological indulgences are less
severe, agrarians are waging a losing battle. No amount of
ideological posturing can exempt agriculture from "[e]conomic
progress," or any other term for the "progressive division of labor
and separation of function."238 Power supplied in one era "by the
farmer's mules" will be "derived from electricity and gasoline" in
another. 239 "It does not require very sophisticated economic logic"
to show how improved technology accelerates concentration in
agricultural markets and "reduce[s] farm incomes and the
240
demand for farm labor."
Professor Thompson has conceded elsewhere that
"[tiechnological impact on the size and distribution of farms is not
morally significant unless we have some reason to think that the
continued existence of family-type farms is valuable in the first
place." 24 1 No valid justifications exist. As I have already noted,
agriculture has a negligible impact on overall employment. Its
contribution to the security of the industrialized state is likewise
minimal. Agriculture's abysmal environmental performance
merely confirms two larger truths: "farming is not an
environmentally benign activity,"242 and small is not beautiful. 243
In short, nothing distinguishes agriculture from any other
mature industry 244 except that this industry inflicts intense
environment damage while remaining politically impervious to
legal reform. "One would be hard pressed to identify another
235.

Id.

236.

VOLTAIRE, supra note 202, at 189.

237. Wolf, supra note 25, at 617. See generally Jon Lauck, Toward an Agrarian
Antitrust:A New Directionfor Agricultural Law, 75 N.D. L. REV. 449 (1999).
238. Farmers Reservoir & Irrig. Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755, 761 (1949).
239. Id.
240. Robert E. Evenson, Intellectual Property Rights and Agribusiness Research
and Development: Implicationsfor the PublicAgriculturalResearch System, 656 AM. J.
AGRIC. ECON. 967, 975 (1983).
241. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 21; see also John Brewster, Technological
Advance and the Futureof the Family Farm, 40 J. FARM ECON. 1596 (1958).
242. Chen, supra note 146, at 872; Chen, AgroecologicalOpium, supra note 157, at
19.
243. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Small Is Not Beautiful: The Case Against Special
Regulatory Treatment of Small Firms,50 ADMIN. L. REV. 537 (1998).
244. See Ruttan, supra note 165, at 1102.
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industry with as poor an environmental record and as light a
regulatory burden."245 It is high time to subject agriculture to the
same rules that govern "any other consumer industry churning
out.., toilet seats or pimple cream to meet the fickle fluctuations
of consumer demand."24 6
C.

WHAT A WONDERFUL WORLD IT WOULD BE

Finally, Robert Wolfs agrarian utopia merits separate
discussion, if only because it supplies the most concrete set of
policies in response to Globalization and Its Losers. Agricultural
self-sufficiency and agrarian virtue inspire his vision of an
"organic, decentralized, and democratic" patchwork of "relatively
self-sustaining regional economies." 247 Mr. Wolf is demanding
nothing less than the mores and misery of the Middle Ages, a
return to the road to serfdom. 248 And even if Mr. Wolfs program of
regional self-sufficiency were plausible and beneficial, it stops so
abruptly at the Iowa border that his notion of social justice has
little if any relevance beyond the United States. Too limited in his
historical and geographic reach, Mr. Wolf fails to articulate a
convincing case for an agrarian antidote to globalization.
Mr. Wolfs utopia is a nostalgic one; he openly yearns for a
return to the time when rural Americans "had. .. the choice of
249
either milling their own lumber and grain or going without."
Assiduously avoiding the usual "slogans" associated with "the
Middle Ages [and] the Old South," he nevertheless advocates a
resurrection of those feudalistic societies in the name of populist
resistance to globalization. 25 0 Indeed, Mr. Wolf betrays a thinly
veiled longing for the Middle Ages, when any individual
European's life "was a nearly unified whole," sheltered by
245. J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 269 (2000).
246. Contra William Aiken, The Goals of Agriculture, in AGRICULTURE, CHANGE,
AND HUMAN VALUES: PROCEEDINGS OF A MULTIDISCIPLINARY CONFERENCE 29, 51-52

(Richard Haynes & Ray Lanier eds., 1982) (complaining that such shabby treatment of
"the very basis for civilization" is "demeaning").
247. Wolf, supra note 25, at 617. See generally AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 24,
at 313-28 (tracing the origins of Mr. Wolfs regionalist vision from traditional
agrarianism).
248. Cf generally F.A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (Milton Friedman intro.,
1994).

249.

Wolf, supra note 25, at 617-18.

250. RICHARD M. WEAVER, THE SOUTHERN TRADITION AT BAY: A HISTORY OF
POST-BELLUM THOUGHTS 394-95 (1968) (urging advocates of the conservative
morality of those societies to disguise their arguments so "that mankind will feel the
march is forward").
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"[m]embership in a guild, manorial estate, or village," when
"individuality and.., ambitions were fulfilled within the
customary law that ruled the community."251 Mr. Wolf evidently
regrets how "[t]he Industrial Revolution destroyed the solid
moorings of an older way of life" and condemns "the great moral
tragedy of the industrial system."25 2 Quite ironically, this is
precisely the desire for order and predictability that promoted
253
corporate and suburban conformity in postwar America.
Medieval sentimentality has sustained many a critic of
modernity. Nineteenth-century globalization wreaked havoc on
plebeians as well as "the patricians and planters": "Crafts were
destroyed, ancient patterns of living broken up and the
urbanisation of the countryside and the industrialisation of
agriculture galloped ahead."254 As industrializing societies
stressed trade and manufacturing, "[t]he ethic of particularized
loyalty" that grew out of the Middle Ages' manorial system of
agriculture "became dysfunctional." 255 The Industrial Revolution
shoved agriculture into a "long run" pattern of "drastic[] decline[U"
from which it has never recovered. 256 The Industrial Revolution
cut so deeply that "revulsion from industrialism has been one of
the
great
stimulants
of
twentieth-century"
western
intellectualism. 25 7 Mr. Wolf s variation on this tired theme hints at
what Miniver Cheevy, Emma Bovary, or Scarlett O'Hara might
propose in response to globalization:
Don't know much about the Middle Ages
Look at the pictures and turn the pages
Don't know much about no rise and fall
25 8
Don't know much about nothing at all

The only trouble with medieval romance is that no one could
live with it. In the global north and west, industrialization and
251.
252.

FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 30 (1951).
Id.
253. See WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 45-46 (1957).
254. J.H. PLUMB, The Historian'sDilemma, in THE MAKING OF AN HISTORIAN: THE
COLLECTED ESSAYS OF J.H. PLUMB 166, 176-77 (1988).
255. THOMPSON, supra note 19, at 9.
256. ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL
CAPITALISM 3 (1990). See generally SIMON KUZNETS, ECONOMIC GROWTH OF NATIONS:
TOTAL OUTPUT AND PRODUCTION STRUCTURE (1971) (tracing the fortunes of

agriculture, industry, and services since the Industrial Revolution).
257. PLUMB, supra note 254, at 177.
258. SAM COOKE, Wonderful World, on GREATEST HITS (BMG/RCA 1998); accord
Stanley Fish, Don't Know Much About the Middle Ages: Posneron Law and Literature,
97 YALE L.J. 777, 793 (1988).
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globalization have eliminated or at least softened many of the
pathologies that saddled preindustrial societies: chattel slavery,
systematic suppression of women, drastically diminished living
conditions for all. To speak credibly of"a pre-industrial Eden, from
which our ancestors were, by the wicked machinations of applied
science, brutally expelled," a social critic must be prepared to
specify exactly 'where... it was located, not in terms of wishful
25 9
fancy, but in time and place, in historical and geographical fact."
The sorry anthropological record presents no such evidence. There
never was a "golden age," a moment and place when humans did
not systematically destroy the environment regardless of their
social, political, and economic situation. 260 We have no choice but
to live in the present. And what a fortuitous, propitious choice it
is:
No one in his senses would choose to have been born in a previous age
unless he could be certain that he would have been born into a
prosperous family, that he could have enjoyed extremely good health,
and that he could have accepted stoically the death of the majority of
261
his children.

This is the sense in which the international legal order and the
globalization it fosters are morally superior to agrarianism. 262
Speaking of morals, Mr. Wolf accuses me of the dreaded
"belief that one's own point in history is the high mark of human
development and the peak of morality, enlightenment, wisdom,
prosperity and knowledge." 263 Fair enough. I freely profess that
"progress in a scientific discipline can be measured by how quickly
its founders are forgotten." 264 I revel in the present. Bliss it is in
265
this very heaven to be alive.
Having raised the issue of morality, Mr. Wolf cannot object to
a moral examination of his proposal. His call for inculcating "the
value of cooperation" through the integration of "local and regional
stories... into school curriculums" seems benign enough, if a bit
quaint. 266 Surely some good comes of teaching values to
SNOW, supra note 34, at 83.
See DIAMOND, supra note 139, at 317-28.
SNOW, supra note 34, at 82 (quoting J.H. Plumb).
See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1989); Daniel J. Gifford,
InterpersonalDistrust in the Modified Rawlsian Society, 48 S.M.U. L. REV. 217 (1994).
259.

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

Wolf, supra note 25, at 615.
WILSON, supra note 75, at 182-83.

265. See William Wordsworth, The French Revolution As It Appeared to
EnthusiastsAt Its Commencement, in THE POETICAL WORKS OF WORDSWORTH, 340, at

11. 4-5 (Paul D. Sheats ed., Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982) (1809).
266. Wolf, supra note 25, at 618.
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children.2 67 On the other hand, when he demands that
"[i]ndividualism... be addressed and countered" as part of "the
preliminary process" of building a regional culture and economy,
he veers toward totalitarianism. 268 He steers astray from the lone
"fixed star in [America's] constitutional constellation," the axiom
"that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion."269 His cry to halt "the outmigration of the young" defies
American social reality27 ° and squarely contradicts another
cherished privilege of American citizenship, the right to travel. 271
He is blind to Paul Thompson's admonition that trade restraints
and other instances of "arbitrary interference in an individual's
right to exchange property with willing traders [are] contrary to
the most basic principles of liberty."27 2 Mr. Wolfs self-sufficient
regionalism evidently requires the suppression of civil liberties.
Under the circumstances, I would rather take my chances with
the global corporate elite and the "Whig view of history"'273 than
Mr. Wolfs Tory view of morality.
Sadly typical of so many critics of globalization, Mr. Wolf
cannot see social injustice beyond his doorstep. His agenda stops
at the water's edge - not just the shores of the Atlantic and
Pacific Oceans, but the banks of the Mississippi River. 274 Even
those elements of his proposal that do not require social coercion
- namely, the establishment of "a regional currency"275 and
greater reliance on farm-level and retail cooperatives 276 -

267. See generally Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for
Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131 (1995).
268. Wolf, supra note 25, at 618.
269. West Virginia State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
270.

See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES (119th ed. 1999), supra

note 149, at 31 (reporting that 30 to 33 percent of persons aged 20-29 in the United
States changed residences over a one-year period, twice the rate of 16 percent for all
persons).
271. Compare Wolf, supra note 25, at 619 (justifying such restraint of freedom in
the name of developing "regional consciousness") with Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489,
498-502 (1999) ("the constitutional right to travel from one State to another is firmly
embedded in our jurisprudence ....the right is so important that it is... a virtually
unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all") (quotations
and citation omitted).
272. Thompson, supra note 20, at 602.
273. Wolf, supra note 25, at 615 (quoting RICHARD WEAVER, IDEAS HAVE
CONSEQUENCES 1 (1948)).
274. See AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 24, at 314 (identifying Mr. Wolf as a
resident of "Iowa, not far from the Mississippi River").
275. Wolf, supra note 25, at 619.
276. Id. at 620.
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presume the existence of a mature, effective system of

law. 2 77

Openly hostile to solutions based on "lawyers" and "panel[s] of
Solons," 27s Mr. Wolf offers nothing to those parts of the world
where the rule of law has not yet taken root. 279 Without
assurances "that the basic rules of the game... are predictable,"
the "'social capital'" needed for "a stable and predictable legal,
28 0
administrative and regulatory framework" will not coalesce.

The most charitable explanation for Mr. Wolfs evident
oversight is that he envisions order without law. 28 ' Fair enough:
with few of the formal trappings of government, private
communities can fashion property rules, 28 2 which public
authorities can later ratify and codify as positive law. 28 3 But
property rights created in such informal settings tend to preserve
preexisting distributions of wealth. Any redistributive agenda
requires the taxing power and regulatory apparatus of the positive

state. 28 4 What Elisabeth Lasch-Quinn says of me more aptly
applies to Robert Wolf: "The implications of [his] thinking for
American democracy - to say nothing of social justice throughout
the world -

5
are disastrous." 28

The upshot is that Mr. Wolfs regional self-sufficiency is
ineffectual, repressive, and chauvinistic. Like the contributors to
277. It is worth noting, if only in passing, the folly of Mr. Wolfs support for
subnational currencies. Compressing the geographic scope of a money-issuing
authority contradicts not only the primary function of money (to lower the costs of
transacting business), but also undermines the unspoken, trust that an issuing
government will honor its financial obligations. Most of the European Union's memberstates are moving in the opposite direction, and with good reason. Ecuador recently
abandoned its currency, the sucre, in favor of the United States dollar. See Matt
Moffett, Ecuador Switch to the Dollar Succeeds Amid Signs of Growth, WALL ST. J.,
Sept 12, 2000, at A21. That money becomes more efficient as it expands its geographic
reach is merely one manifestation of network effects. See generally Lemley &
McGowan, supra note 128.
278. Wolf, supra note 25 at 617.
279. See Viet D. Dinh, What Is the Law in Law & Development?, 3 GREEN BAG 2D
19 (1999).
280. NEw ECONOMY, supra note 112, at 19-20; see also id. at 18 ("[Many of the
social benefits which flow from human capital accumulation, such as better health,
greater civic engagement, lower crime and enhanced social cohesion, may feed back
into economic growth in the longer term.").
281. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DIsPUTEs (1991).
282. See ANTHONY DE JASAY, SOCIAL CONTRACT, FREE RIDE: A STUDY OF THE
PUBLIC GOODS PROBLEM (1989); R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. &
ECON. 357 (1974).
283. See Ejan MacKaay, Economic Incentives in Markets for Information and
Innovation, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 867, 902-03 (1988).
284. See Chen, supra note 127, at 1040-41.
285. Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 590.

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol.10:l

CorporationsAre Gonna Get Your Mama,28 6 a collection of essays
from which Mr. Wolf draws many of his ideas, Mr. Wolf has only
one real complaint: "the downsizing of the American dream." In a
journal that has already urged, "Mama, don't let your babies grow
up to be cowboys," 28 7 it is not too cheeky to reply, "That don't
impress me much. 28 8 Of all of globalization's losers, the least
impressive are temporarily displaced workers in the world's
richest, most powerful country.
IV. THE POLITICS OF PLACE
A. DEMOCRACY DOES HAVE LOSERS
Systematic resistance to agrarianism should be a goal of in
international economic law. The case for free trade began as a
rejection of agricultural protectionism. David Ricardo derived his
theory of comparative advantage from a critique of Great Britain's
Corn Laws.28 9 After the collapse of communism, agrarianism
remains the lone expression of autarky and centralized planning
that commands widespread respect among Western politicians
and intellectuals. Yet no other popular political philosophy is as
inimical to trade law and as destructive of human welfare. On
virtually every question of distributive justice among nations,
distributive justice within nations, and personal liberty,
agrarianism supplies the wrong answer.
Domestic agricultural support, especially through disguised
and overt barriers to trade, has become the quintessential model
of special interest rent-seeking. 290 True to the insights of modern

286. CORPORATIONS ARE GONNA GET YOUR MAMA: GLOBALIZATION AND THE
DOWNSIZING OF THE AMERICAN DREAM (Kevin Danaher ed., 1996).
287. Robin L. Van Harpen, Note, Mamas, Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be
Cowboys: Reconciling Trade and Cultural Independence, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
165 (1995). "Cowboys," after all, "ain't easy to love, and they're harder to hold. They'd
rather give you a song than diamonds or gold." WAYLON JENNINGS & WILLIE NELSON,
Mamas Don't Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be Cowboys, on WAYLON AND WILLIE (RCA
1978); accord United States v. Garth, 773 F.2d 1469, 1476 n.11 (5th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
288. SHANIA TWAIN, That Don't Impress Me Much, on COME ON OVER
(UNI/Mercury Nashville 1997).
289. See MICHAEL J. GOOTZEiT, DAVID RICARDO 27 (1975).
290. See MICHAEL T. HAYES, LOBBYISTS AND LEGISLATORS: A THEORY OF
POLITICAL MARKETS 101-02 (1981); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE II, at 239-41
(1989); MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 144-45 (1965).
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public choice theory, 29 1 agricultural legislation routinely benefits
concentrated, well-organized groups of farmers at the expense of
food and fiber consumers, who are too broadly dispersed to offer
effective political resistance. The industry as a whole has won so
many regulatory exemptions that agriculture is aptly described as
292
a "favorite child" of the federal government.
On the global stage, perhaps enfant terrible would be a better
sobriquet. The yawning gap between domestic legal protection for
agriculture and any plausible defense for such largess explains
why agriculture remains "the problem child of world trade."293 The
rocky road to Marrakesh was littered with failed attempts to
reconcile agriculture with global trade.2 94 Recasting agriculture as
a "multifunctional" activity, the solution favored by Paul
Thompson and the European Union, merely invites nations to
abuse "environmental standards" as "especially attractive
candidates for disguised protectionism." 295 Standards as vague as
multifunctionality or even sustainability are "far more susceptible
to political capture" than specific and transparent environmental
measures. 296 In light of contemporary society's rampant
agricultural illiteracy, 297 the solution lies in subjecting domestic
291. See generally Daniel A. Farber, Positive Theory as Normative Critique, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1565 (1995).
292. Fairdale Farms, Inc. v. Yankee Milk, Inc., 635 F.2d 1037, 1043 (2d Cir. 1980)
(quotations omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 818 (1981).
293. Jeffrey J. Steinle, Note, The Problem Child of World Trade:Reform School for
Agriculture, 4 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 333 (1995).
294. See generally TIMOTHY E. JOSLING, STEFAN TANGERMANN & T.K WARLEY,
AGRICULTURE IN THE GATT (1996); Al J. Daniel Jr., Agricultural Reform: The
European Community, the Uruguay Round, and InternationalDispute Resolution, 46
ARK. L. REV. 873 (1994); Jon G. Filipek, Agriculture in a World of Comparative
Advantage: The Prospects for Farm Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round of
GATT Negotiations,30 HARV. IN'L L.J. 123 (1989); Jimmye S. Hillman, Agriculturein
the Uruguay Round: A United States Perspective, 38 TULSA L.J. 761 (1993); Liane L.
Heggy, Free Trade Meets U.S. Farm Policy: Life After the Uruguay Round, 25 LAW &
POL'Y IN'L Bus. 1367 (1994).
295. C. Ford Runge, Trade Protectionism and Environmental Regulations: The
New Nontariff Barriers, 11 Nw. J. IN'L L. & BuS. 47, 47 (1990); see also DANIEL C.
ESTY, GREENING THE GAIT 45 (1994); cf Frieder Roessler, Domestic Policy Objectives
and the MultilateralTrade Order: Lessons from the Past, 19 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
513, 514 (1998) (observing that regulatory burdens on foreign competitors are
routinely rationalized as being in the "public interest"). See generally ACHIM KORBER,
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONISM (2000); Alan 0. Sykes,
Regulatory Protectionism and the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1
(1999).
296. Pamela Isela Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of
Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017, 1063
(1999).
297. See supra text accompanying note 216.
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agricultural legislation to exceeding skeptical scrutiny by
international tribunals such as the WTO.298
Democracy should not have losers, 299 but it does. Organized
interests hold an overwhelming political advantage over
"anonymous and diffuse" majorities. 30 0 That marginal difference in
power becomes magnified when an entrenched group moves to
quash a competitive threat through lobbying. Such political
30 1
leverage reaches its apex when competition hails from abroad.
By empowering otherwise captive consumers and employers to
buy from abroad, globalization shifts the political balance of power
from incumbent industry and labor. Those who decry the lack of
representation and accountability in the WTO, the IMF, and the
World Bank have not identified substantial democratic defects in
those institutions. Rather, their real complaint is that
globalization and the concomitant transfer of legal responsibility
to multilateral organizations have diminished the political
leverage to which incumbent domestic interests have become
302
accustomed.
Globalization as political upheaval is giving rise to
cooperative "transnational epistemic communities" of businesses,
governments, and nongovernmental organizations. 3 3 The most
striking exception to this cooperative approach is advocacy on
behalf of First World farmers and other economic interests
threatened by global competition. 30 4 The twin-barreled blasts of
economic autarky and political anarchy constitute the politics of
place, a call for the restoration of the old order that preceded
globalization. Self-sufficiency and national sovereignty are code
words for protectionism and withdrawal from international
cooperation.
298.
State: A
1416-18
299.
300.
(1985).

See Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory
GAT~s-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1401,
(1994).
See Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 589.
Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723-24

301.

See ROBERT Z. LAWRENCE & ROBERT E. LITAN, SAVING FREE TRADE 23-24

(1986).
302. Cf Judith Hippler Bello, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding:Less Is
More, 90 AM. J. LN'L L. 416, 417 (1996) (noting that interest groups object to the WTO
because transparency through international law exposes the inefficiency of these
groups' preferred policies).
303. See generally Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and
InternationalPolicy Coordination,46 INT'L ORG. 1 (1992).
304. See Isaiah Frank, Toward Freer Trade Among Nations: A U.S. Perspective,
in TOWARDs FREER TRADE BETWEEN NATIONS 44, 55 (John Nieuwenhuysen ed.,
1989).
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Most attacks on globalization, in fact, have little to do with
international institutions or law. What the Battle in Seattle really
decried was "the direction of national government policies. '305 At
worst, the rhetoric borders on the offensive. Robert Wolf, for
instance, has the gall to compare the depopulation of "[n] umerous
rural regions within the United States" with the "coloniz[ation]" of
"Third World countries." 30 6 When Iowans line up to trade places
with their counterparts in Bangladesh, Bolivia, and Burkina Faso,
we can begin to think of rural America as the Third World. As
matters stand, an Iowa long on civilized comforts but short on
productive population now proposes to reinvent itself as the "Ellis
Island of the Midwest." 30 7 Contrary to the dire predictions of
globalization's shrillest critics, Iowa as immigration magnet will
realize economic renewal and population gain because of, not in
spite of, high wages and stringent environmental standards. As
New York did during the nineteenth century's experience with
globalization, Iowa bestrides the world like a New Colossus:
Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
30 8
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.

The real Third World is in fact the most important
battleground in international economic law. Globalization's impact
on developing nations having been called into question, I now
address economic and social issues I left unresolved in
Globalizationand Its Losers.
B.

THE FORGOTTEN WINNERS

Globalization and Its Losers was too quick to assume that
globalization "widen[s] existing disparities in the distribution of

305.

Barbara Crossette, Globalization Tops 3-Day U.N. Agenda for World Leaders,

N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2000, § 1, at 1, 4 (quoting Malloch Brown of the United Nations
Development Program); see also Robert E. Baldwin, The Changing Nature of U.S.
Trade Policy Since World War H, in THE STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RECENT U.S.

5 (Robert E. Baldwin & Anne 0. Krueger eds., 1984) (observing that the
public perception that a government has too strongly favored foreign interests can
generate a severe political backlash against free trade).
306. Wolf, supra note 25, at 618; see also. AMERICAN MOSAIC, supra note 24, at 314
(calling "most of rural America," including Iowa, "part of the Third World").
TRADE POLICY

307.

See Pam Belluck, Short of People, Iowa Seeks to Be Ellis Island of Midwest,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2000, at Al.
308.

Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus (1883), reprinted in EMMA LAZARUS:

SELECTIONS FROM HER POETRY AND PROSE 48

(Morris Schappes ed., 1967).
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wealth." 30 9 There are actually two variants of this common
complaint. According to "some of the NGOs that disrupted the
[1999] WTO meetings in Seattle," the poor "in general.., do not
benefit from global growth."310 A second, "slightly different" line of
criticism contends that "the poor.., benefit proportionately less
than the average household, so that inequality within countries is
on the rise."311 Economic data undermine both claims. "[T]he
income of the poor [almost always] rises during periods of
significant growth," so that "growth in the overall economy is
reflected one-for-one in growth in income of the poor."312 The
benefit to the poor is immediate; across-the-board growth through
globalization "is not some process of trickle-down... in which the
rich get richer first.. ,,313 There is no empirical support for the
old hypothesis "that inequality tends to increase during
the early
314
stages of development and then decrease later on."

Of its own strength, growth offsets much of the inequality
attributable to globalization. In economies experiencing rapid,
globalization-fueled growth, "the positive effects of growth have
outpaced the negative impact of inequitable income distribution"
to such a degree that globalization can be credited for having
"substantially improved living conditions for the world's most
poor."315 Globalization's positive economic impact is most dramatic
along the frontiers of extreme and absolute poverty, which the
World Bank defines according to "reference lines set at $1 and $2
per day" in 1993 terms, adjusted for "the relative purchasing
power of currencies across countries." 316 By the World Bank's
309. Chen, supra note 3, at 166.
310. DAvID DOLLAR & AART KRAAY, GROWTH IS GOOD FOR THE POOR 1 (2000)
(preliminary draft availableat http//www.worldbank.org/research).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 3; see also Shaohua Chen & Martin Ravaillion, What Can New Survey
Data Tell Us About Recent Changes in Distributionand Poverty?, 11 WORLD BANK
ECON. REV. 357 (1997); Klaus Deininger & Lyn Squire, A New Data Set Measuring
Income Inequality, 10 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 565 (1996); William Easterly, Life
DuringGrowth, 4 J. ECON. GROWTH 239 (1999).
313. DOLLAR & KRAAY, supra note 310, at 6.
314. Id. at 4. Contra Simon Kuznets, Economic Growth and Income Inequality, 45
AM. ECON. REV. 1, 7-8 (1955).
315. AT. KEARNEY, INC., GLOBAL BusINEss POLICY COUNCIL, GLOBALIZATION
LEDGER 7 (April 2000) [hereinafter KEARNEY GLOBALIZATION LEDGER] available at
http://www.atkearney.com.
316. World Bank, Measuring Poverty, at http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/
mission/up2.htm [hereinafter Measuring Poverty]. See generally Amartya K. Sen,
Poverty: An OrdinalApproach to Measurement, 44 ECONOMETRICA 219 (1976) (defining
poverty, inequality, and welfare and distinguishing these three concepts from each
other).

20011

EPIPHYTIC ECONOMICS

conservative estimate, the percentage of the world's population
living in extreme poverty -

on less than $1 a day -

fell from 28.3

to 24.0 percent between 1987 and 1998.317 A more optimistic study
has concluded that "the share of the world's population earning
less than US$2 per day shrank by more than half' between 1980
and 1990, "from 34 to 16.6 percent." 318 In concrete terms, over the
course of that decade "economic growth associated 3with
19
globalization" lifted 1.4 billion people out of absolute poverty.
Much work nevertheless remains. Let us return to the World
Bank's more sober assessment of global poverty. As of 1998, 2.8
billion people worldwide subsisted on less than $2 a day; almost
1.2 billion of those people lived on less than $1 a day. 320 Despite
recent economic gains, the absolute number of extremely poor
persons remained steady at 1.2 billion 321 due to an increase of 815
million in the global population between 1987 and 1998. In
confronting "the central challenge.., to ensure that globalization
becomes a positive force for all the world's people," the United
Nations' Millennium Declaration resolves to halve three separate
measures of misery by 2015: "the proportion of the world's people
whose income is less than $1 a day," the proportion who "suffer
from hunger," and the proportion "who are unable to reach, or to
322
afford, safe drinking water."
How then should the nations of the world address the twin
economic challenges of spurring growth and curbing inequality?
The answer lies in more economic integration, not less. Openness
to trade unequivocally increases per capita income. 323 Trade
liberalization helps alleviate poverty by "allow[ing] people to
exploit their productive potential, assist[ing] economic growth,
curtail [ing] arbitrary policy interventions and help [ing] to insulate

317. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES 29 (2000) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS].
318. KEARNEY GLOBALIZATION LEDGER, supra note 315, at 8.
319. Id. at 1.
320. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 317, at 29; Measuring Poverty,
supra note 316.
321. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 317, at 28.
322. In Statement by the U.N.: The Need for Balance, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at
A4. The text of the U.N. Millennium Declaration is available at http://www.un.org.
323. See DAN BEN-DAVID, HAKAN NORDSTROM & L. ALAN WINTERS, TRADE,
INCOME DISPARITY AND POVERTY 4 (WTO 1999) ("[Clountries that expand bilateral
trade are likely to find their incomes converging more rapidly than otherwise");
DOLLAR & KRAAY,supra note 310, at 5; Jeffrey A. Frankel & David Romer, Does Trade
Cause Growth?, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 379, 380-81 (1999); see also David Dollar,
Outward-OrientedDeveloping CountriesReally Do Grow More Rapidly: Evidence from
95 LDCs, 1976-1985, 40 ECON. DEV.& CULT. CHANGE 523 (1992).
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against shocks. 32 4 "Reducing government consumption and
stabilizing inflation" achieve "'super-pro-poor'" results insofar as
these policies "raise overall incomes" and "have an additional
positive effect on the distribution of income." 325 Ensuring the rule
of law, a rhetorically modest but pragmatically monumental
achievement in some corners of the world, promises much of the
same. 326 Not surprisingly, "the basic policy package of private
327
property rights, fiscal discipline, and openness to trade"
coincides with the formula that the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development has prescribed for job growth in
developed nations. 328 How has the United States, more than any
other country in the world, tapped the power of the epiphytic
economy? "Deregulation," "the largest and most creative financial
markets in the world," low "barriers to bankruptcy," and labor
markets that are "much more fluid.., than most other
countries[']," and a cultural affinity "for entrepreneurism and
risktaking. 3 2 9 In other words, it is not the embrace of
globalization but rather its rejection that demonstrates "genuine
330
lack of heart."
In short, "anyone who cares about the poor should favor the
growth-enhancing policies of good rule of law, fiscal discipline, and
openness to international trade."331 Nevertheless, I do not
abandon from my earlier endorsement of direct wealth transfers
for some of globalization's real losers. 332 Trade reforms do "create
333
some losers" and may even "temporarily" exacerbate poverty.

324. BEN-DAVID ET AL., supra note 323, at 6.
325. DOLLAR & KRAAY, supra note 310, at 5-6.
326. See id. at 5.
327. Id. at 6; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse,
1996 U. CH. LEGAL F. 207, 209-213 (recommending three goals for law in the postagrarian "new economy": "make rules clearer, to promote bargains"; "create property
rights, where there are none"; and "create bargaining institutions").
328. See generally ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
THE OECD JOBS STRATEGY: ASSESSING PERFORMANCE AND POLICY (1999);
ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT, IMPLEMENTING THE
OECD JOBS STRATEGY: LESSONS FROM MEMBER COuNTRIES' EXPERIENCE (2000).
329. DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 119, at 66; see also Robert C. Holland, The
Committee for Economic Development Report on United States Technology Policy, in
TECHNOLOGY, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 79, 88-89 (Hugh H.
Miller & Rolf R. Piekarz eds., 1982) (recommending regulatory changes, governmental
support for basic research, and tax changes favoring research and development as part
of a macroeconomic tonic for innovation).
330. Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 591.
331. DOLLAR & KRAAY, supra note 310, at 27.
332. Chen, supra note 3, at 212 ("To put it bluntly, we need to bribe the losers.").
333. BEN-DAVID, supra note 323, at 6.
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The "appropriate policy response," however, is not to "abandon the
reform process" but to adopt the most politically accountable,
economically efficient means of "alleviat[ing] the hardships and
facilitat[ing] adjustments."3 34 Because "public expenditure on
social services" in many countries "often is not well-targeted
towards the poor," direct social spending "shows little effect on
either growth or distribution."335 To the extent that globalization
has an indirect but positive impact on political freedom, 336 it can
improve the effectiveness of social spending programs by
combating official corruption and mismanagement at or below the
337
national level.
Though globalization's most vocal critics often claim the
legacy of the New Deal and the Great Society, they routinely reject
tax-financed solutions in favor of trade restraints. On a panel of
putatively progressive critics, John Miller alone acknowledges my
endorsement "of large, governmentally-mandated
wealth
transfers."338 If civilized society genuinely wishes undertake to
alleviate the suffering of the poorest among us, a commitment I
readily accept, the choice lies between free trade coupled with
public assistance on one hand and differently targeted wealth
redistribution through local monopolies on the other.
The only explanation I can imagine for this hostility toward
free trade, progressive taxation, and transparent welfare is the
work fetish that marks agrarianism and cognate political
philosophies. Why this must be so defies my understanding.
Agrarian Wes Jackson demonstrates that making a fetish of labor,
much as the laissez faire capitalism of the Industrial Revolution
made a fetish of commodities, 339 has no secure place in agrarian
thought. 340 The preference for sweat equity, merely implied by my
critics but expressed outright by Wendell Berry, represents the
modern left's abandonment of Karl Marx for Max Weber. I had
thought, admittedly before the New Property transmogrified into
the New Left, that welfare was as dignified as any other form of
334.
335.

Id.
DOLLAR & KRAAY, supra note 310, at 6.

336. KEARNEY GLOBALIZATION LEDGER, supra note 315, at 9-10.
337. See generally JONATHAN TEMPLE, GROWTH EFFECTS OF EDUCATION AND
SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE OECD (2000); COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, ENGINEERING, AND
PUBLIC POLICY, CAPITALIZING ON INVESTMENTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
(1999).

338. Miller, supra note 14, at 595.
339. See Duncan Kennedy, The Role of Law in Economic Thought: Essays on the
Fetishism of Commodities, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 939, 945-51 (1985).
340. See WES JACKSON, NEW ROOTS FOR AGRICULTURE 112 (1980) (identifying the
alleviation of drudgery as a legitimate agrarian goal).
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property.341
"In every measure... [of] standard of living, such as real
income, homelessness, life expectancy, and height, the gains of the
lower classes have been far greater than those experienced by the
population as a whole, whose overall standard of living.., also
improved" during the twentieth century.342 The most selfconsciously anthropocentric critics of globalization have failed to
acknowledge its positive impact on the humblest members of the
human family. With so much to gain from further economic
integration, those who have risen from the abject poverty of the
343
developing world are globalization's forgotten winners.
In most of the world, life is still "solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short."344 Two generations ago C.P. Snow identified
the real stakes in the intellectual struggle between the
industrialism of the scientific community and the Luddite
romanticism of the humanistic community:
Most of our fellow human beings ... are underfed and die before their
time. In the crudest terms, that is the social condition. There is a
moral trap which comes through th[is] insight into man's loneliness: it
tempts one to sit back, complacent
in one's unique tragedy, and let the
345
others go without a meal.

That struggle continues today. Heirs of the West's antiindustrial tradition, globalization's critics still urge "voluntary
simplicity."346 It is one thing for those whose idiosyncratic
"aesthetic revulsion[s]" lead them to forgo "food, see most of [their]
children die in infancy, despise the comforts of literacy, [and]
accept twenty years off [their] own li[ves]. "347 To "impose the same
choice on others who are not free to choose," however, deserves
condemnation, even contempt. 348 To "despise the elemental
needs," especially "when one has been granted them and others
have not ....is simply to be inhuman, or more exactly antihuman."349

341.

342.

See Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964).
Virginia Postrel, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2000, at C2. See

generally ROBERT W. FOGEL, THE FouRTH GREAT AWAKENING AND THE FuTURE OF

EGALITARIANISM 137-75 (2000) (documenting the impressive scale of economic and
biomedical gains realized by ordinary people during the twentieth century)
343. Cf Suzanna Sherry, The ForgottenVictims, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 375 (1992).
344. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1st ed. 1651).
345. SNOW, supra note 34, at 6-7 (emphasis in original).
346. See supra text accompanying note 91.
347. SNOW, supra note 34, at 25-26.
348. Id. at 26.
349. Id. at 79.

2001]
C.

EPIPHYTIC ECONOMICS

CAN'T Buy ME LAW

In all fairness, globalization's most vocal critics are simply
behaving according to their genetic heritage as humans. Even
amid fantastic wealth beyond the dreams of their ancestors and
the reach of their contemporaries, children of privilege will
complain. Any evolutionary psychologist knows that it is relative
30
and not absolute well-being that satisfies the human beast:
[A]s soon as... basic problems of survival are solved, merely having
enough food and a comfortable shelter is no longer to make people
content. New needs are felt, new desires arise. With affluence and
power come escalating expectations, and as our level of wealth and
comforts keeps increasing, the sense
of well-being we hoped to achieve
351
keeps receding into the distance.

Mindful that I ought not hold my critics to a standard that
exceeds their capacity as humans, I will now respond to John
Miller's complaint that the standard defense of globalization tends
to "focus... on economic matters to the exclusion of moral and
social considerations." 35 2 Globalization does in fact have salutary

social effects. I shall briefly mention globalization's positive impact
on matters of social, environmental, and political concern.
First, aggressive globalization has "demonstrated an
unmatched ability to transform economic growth into gains in

social development." 35 3 Although "government social spending,
formal democratic institutions, and primary school enrollment"
350. See, e.g., Mark Epstein, Opening Up To Happiness, PSYCHOL. TODAY, July
1995, at 42.
351. MIHALY CsIKSzENTMIHALYI, FLow: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL
EXPERIENCE 10 (1990); see also WALKER PERCY, The Delta Factor,in THE MESSAGE IN
THE BOTTLE: How QUEER MAN IS, How QUEER LANGUAGE IS, AND WHAT ONE HAS TO
Do WITH THE OTHER 3, 3 (1986) ("Why does man feel so bad in the very age when, more
than in any other age, he has succeeded in satisfying his needs and making over the
world for his own use?"); Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 769, 772
n.10 (arguing that wealth, like heroin, is addictive and that increased wealth simply
breeds greater aversion to loss without delivering greater actual satisfaction); cf F.
SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 141 (Matthew J. Bruccoli ed., 1991) (1st ed.
1925) ("He had come a long way to this blue lawn and his dream must have seemed so
close that he could hardly fail to grasp it. He did not know that it was already behind
him, somewhere back in that vast obscurity beyond the city, where the dark fields of
the republic rolled on under the night.").
352. Miller, supra note 14, at 600; cf Lasch-Quinn, supra note 10, at 593
(demanding "profound deliberation of" and a sharp distinction between "what properly
belongs in the market - and what does not").
353. KEARNEY GLOBALIZATION LEDGER, supra note 315, at 14 (measuring social
progress by the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index of
lifespan, literacy, and quality of life). See generally UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT
PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT (Bruce Ross-Larson ed., 2000).
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have a "less robust" impact on growth and income distribution, 354
it is nevertheless worth noting that nations committed to
globalization undertake greater social spending 55 and enjoy
greater enrollment levels at every educational level. 35 6 This

socioeconomic virtuous circle flourishes in the long run: "many of
the social benefits which flow from human capital accumulation
such as better health, greater civic engagement, lower crime and
enhanced social cohesion may feed back into economic growth in
357
the longer term."
Second, increased worldwide wealth pays a green dividend.
Rising income spurs a taste for environmental protection and the
means with which to pay for it.358 As matters stand, the
developing world not only lacks the resources needed to redress
environmental problems, but also has come to regard
environmental protection as a concern of the rich. 3 9 Developing
nations often feel burdened by the high cost of complying with the
environmental standards of the United States and other First
World nations. 360 At an extreme, the developing world regards the

environmental imperatives of the global north and west as
imperialism in green drag. 361 There is an urgent need to
coordinate free trade and environmental protection as

"complementary" policies. 362 Strictly local solutions will not suffice;

only strong centralized regulation, not "haphazard local
encouragement," can adequately address "diffuse, crossjurisdictional" problems such as mobile source emissions and
nonpoint-source runoff.363 "[E]nvironmental interconnection has
become too real to ignore"; the "existence of transboundary
354.

DOLLAR & KRAAY, supra note 310, at 6.

355.

See KEARNEY GLOBALIZATION LEDGER, supra note 315, at 11.

356. See id. at 12-14.
357. NEW ECONOMY, supra note 112, at 18. See generally JONATHAN TEMPLE,
GROWTH EFFECTS OF EDUCATION AND SOCIAL CAPITAL IN THE OECD (2000).
358. See, e.g., GENE M. GROSSMAN & ALAN D. KRUEGER, ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACTS OF A NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 5 (1991); PETER HUBER,
HARD GREEN 151 (2000); OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT: CONFLICTS AND OPPORTUNITIES 4-6, 22-24 (1992).
359. See Runge, supranote 295, at 52.
360. See Raj Bhala, Mrs. WATU and InternationalTrade Sanctions, 33 IN'L LAW.
1, 21 (1999).
361. See Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade
Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 347, 376-77 (1994).
362. Jackson, supra note 54, at 1228 ("[Ilncreasing world welfare can lead to
citizen demands and governmental actions to improve protection for the
environment.").
363. Stephen M. Nickelsburg, Note, Mere Volunteers? The Promise and Limits of
Community-Based EnvironmentalProtection,84 VA. L. REV. 1371, 1409 (1998).
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communities inevitably creates a drive away from localism in all
spheres."364 Of the environmental problems that plague this
mutually dependent world, "persistent poverty may turn out to be
the most aggravating and destructive."365 We must remember
"above all else, that human degradation and deprivation...
constitute the greatest threat not only to national, regional, and
world security, but to essential, life-supporting ecological
366
systems."
Finally, free trade outperforms agrarianism as a core political
right. The political apology for agrarianism found its perfect
expression in the writings of Thomas Jefferson: "Those who labor
in the earth are the chosen people of God.... whose breasts he
has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine
virtue." 36 Jeffersonian agrarianism, perhaps the most frequently
invoked political philosophy in agricultural scholarship, 368 has
inspired both Paul Thompson 369 and Robert Wolf 370 The very
farmers whom Jefferson called "the chosen people of God," a
flawless "mass of cultivators" immune from "[c]orruption of
morals,"371 eventually waged fratricidal war in defense of the
ultimate agrarian crime against humanity. 372 Let it never be
forgotten that Jeffersonian agrarianism reached its apogee at
Gettysburg, that at least one American polity dedicated to
373
localism mercifully "Died of [that] Theory."
364. Daniel A. Farber, Stretching the Margins: The Geographic Nexus in
Environmental Law, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1247, 1271 (1996).
365. Patrick Low, Thade and the Environment: What Worries the Developing
Countries?,23 ENVTL. L. 705, 706 (1993).
366. James A. Lee, Conservation in a World in Search of a Future, in
CONSERVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 284, 287 (David Western & Mary C. Pearl eds.,
1989).
367. THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 164-65 (Willaim
Peden ed., 1955).
368. See, e.g., Linda A. Malone, Reflections on the Jeffersonian Ideal of an
Agrarian Democracy and the Emergence of an Agricultural and Environmental Ethic
in the 1990 Farm Bill, 12 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 3, 4-7 (1993); Joseph P. Viteritti & Gerald
J. Russello, Community and American Federalism:Images Romantic and Real, 4 VA.
J. SOC. POLY & L. 683, 687-88 (1997).
369. See Thompson, supra note 20, at 608 (defending agrarianism as a boost for all
nascent states and as a boon for "democracy when land holdings are widely
distributed," as in "Jefferson's America").
370. See AMERICAN MOsAIc, supra note 24, at 321 (reporting how Mr. Wolf found
"smatterings of Jefferson" to be "confirmation for [his agrarian] thoughts").
371. JEFFERSON, supra note 367, at 174-75.
372. See Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience and Its Fruit,48 VAND. L.
REV. 1261 (1995).
373. 3 SHELBY FOOTE, THE CIVIL WAR: A NARRATIVE: RED RIVER TO APPOMATTOX
766 (1974) (quoting Jefferson Davis).
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Of its own force, condemning the ritual worship of Jefferson
could serve as this essay's service to legal scholarship. Jefferson's
"rules of construction for the authorities vested in the Government
of the Union would arrest all its essential movements and bring it
back in practice to the same state of imbecility which rendered the
old confederation contemptible." 374 Professor Thompson comes
much closer to the heart of the matter when he admits that
"[aigrarian political theory... has been asserted in defense of
some unsavory political movements." 375 My critics' fixation with
small-scale enterprise and self-sufficiency marks merely one sense
in which "the twentieth-century statesman whom... Thomas
376
Jefferson... would have admired most is Pol Pot."
Historically speaking, more freedom has arisen from the
economic erosion of agrarian influence than from a calculated
preservation of agrarian values. For all his flaws, even Karl Marx
understood how industrialization and the gradual migration of
labor out of agriculture "rescued a considerable part of the
population from the idiocy of rural life."377 "Slave of the wheel of
labor, what to him / Are Plato and the swing of Pleiades?" 378 The
few women and slaves who enjoyed the franchise at the time of
the American founding supported economic and political union
among the states - the closest thing to globalization in the late
eighteenth century - because the complex social structures
arising from economic integration tend to liberate groups who
379
remain disempowered in simpler, more traditional settings.
Globalization and the mass diffusion of information promise "to
neutralize inequities based on gender and race and to make such
factors irrelevant in the calculation of opportunities available for
380
economic advantage."
In this spirit, our own age of mass transport of goods, persons,
374.

ALEXANDER HAMILTON,

12 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON

249

(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1967) (criticizing the government in an August 18, 1792 letter to
George Washington); see also FORREST MCDONALD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON: A
BIOGRAPHY 253 (1979) (explaining that the criticism was directed entirely at
Jefferson).
375. Thompson, supra note 20, at 608.
376. CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE LONG AFFAIR: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE
FRENCH REVOLUTION, 1785-1800, at 150 (1996).

377. Communist Manifesto, supra note 2, at 477.
378. Edwin Markham, The Man with the Hoe, in AMERICAN LYRIC POEMS: FROM
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 75, 76 (Elder Olson ed., 1964).
379. See Rosmarie Zagarri, Gender and the First Party System, in FEDERALISTS
RECONSIDERED 118, 131-34 (Doron Ben-Atar & Barbara B. Oberg eds., 1999).
380. Ruth Gana Okediji, Copyright and Public Welfare in Global Perspective, 7
IND. J. GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 117, 183 (1999).
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and ideas can draw inspiration from the six and a half million
Americans of African descent, many a mere generation removed
from slavery and sharecropping, who over the course of six
decades completed "one of the largest and most rapid mass
internal movements of people in history."381 This story, which
consists principally of "country people" who "fle]ll in love with
[the] city" upon escaping the farm, contains a transformative
power without parallel in the American pageant. 3 2 Its lessons
respect no temporal, geographic, or cultural boundaries.
The localist outcry has obscured globalization's very concrete
contribution to personal and political freedom. A more
geographically circumscribed world was vulnerable to what James
Madison called "faction," the machinations of corrupt insiders,
"united and actuated by some common impulse of passion...
adverse to... the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community" at large. 38 3 (Quite preciently, Madison identified
international trade as the sort of issue that would foment
faction.)384 Madison understood that the proper cure for faction
lies in expanding government's geographic reach so that no single,
locally entrenched ideology or interest would attain a harmful
political dominance. 38 5 What the United States achieved by
expanding its borders from "the St. Croix to the Gulph of Mexico,
from the Atlantic to the Pacific" and beyond, 38 6 international
economic law after Bretton Woods and Marrakesh is slowly
creating on a worldwide scale. Political freedom is all the healthier
because of the WTO, World Bank, and IMF, especially in portions
of the world that have hitherto tasted too little of it.
D.

FROM SEA TO SEA TO SHINING SEA

Globalization is a class struggle, as all life is a class
struggle. 387 Neither globalization nor any of its proffered
381. NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND
How IT CHANGED AMERICA 6 (1991).

382. TONI MORRISON, JAzz 33 (1992).
383. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
384. See id. at 48.
385. See id. at 51-52.
386. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 408 (1819).
387. Compare Communist Manifesto, supra note 2, at 473 ("The history of all
hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle") with Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("That at any rate is the theory of our
Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment."). See also FRIEDMAN,
supra note 113, at 274 ("Like all revolutions, globalization involves a shift in power
from one group to another.").
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alternatives can eliminate "class antagonisms"; all that social
change can do is "establish[] new classes, new conditions of
388
oppression, new forms of struggle in place of the old ones."
Threatened incumbents seek refuge in the localist yearning for
"homecoming" - for a life mission based on a purposeful return to
the place of one's birth.38 9 For good or for ill, the emergence of an
epiphytic economy and the commensurate expansion of the
political arena have accorded irrevocably greater value to
"portable skills that a person can use without ever sinking roots in
390
a place."

Globalization does inflict emotional trauma on persons in
economic and cultural transit. To wander through life "without
any one spot of earth being dearer.., than another" is admittedly
to feel "the clutch of solitude at [one's] heart, the sense of being
swept like a stray uprooted growth down the heedless current of
the years."391 But the human pageant has long since passed the
"weather-beaten sunburnt village[s] of the hills, abandoned of men
[and women], left apart by railway, trolley, telegraph, and all the
forces that link life to life in modern communities." 392
Globalization has delivered its most dramatic gains to its
forgotten winners, the impoverished folk who have lived "in
Starkfield too many winters" 393 in rotten boroughs. Localism's sole
contribution to the debate is to identify the innate human longing
for a sense of community and place. That challenge numbers
among the many facing transient populations in a globalized,
interconnected world.
Slowing or even stopping world trade will not accomplish this
goal. "[P]rotectionism raises prices, entrenches inefficiency and
destroys more jobs than it saves."394 Trade liberalization, in
addition to countering these baneful economic effects, does pay a
peace dividend - in terms of stability abroad and greater political
participation at home. 395 All this and more has been known for
years;396 it is simply incredible "that all [these] facts should speak
388.

Communist Manifesto, supra note 2, at 474.

389.

See WES JACKSON, BECOMING NATWVE TO THIS PLACE 3 (1994).

390. Eric T. Freyfogle, The Particularsof Owning, 25 ECOL. L.Q. 574, 589 (1999).
391. EDITH WHARTON, THE HOUSE OF MIRTH 307, 306 (R.W.B. Lewis intro. 1984)
(1st ed. 1905).
392. EDITH WHARTON, SUMMER 3 (Candace Wald intro., 1993) (1st ed. 1916).
393. EDITH WHARTON, ETHAN FROME 6 (Doris Grumbach ed. 1987) (1st ed. 1922).
394. Robert W. McGee, An Economic Analysis of Protectionism in the United
States with Implications for InternationalTrade in Europe, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L.
& ECON. 539, 550 (1993).
395. See id. at 552.
396. See generally, e.g., JAGDISH BHAGWATI, PROTECTIONISM 7-9 (1988); ANNE
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falsely." 397 Stating these truths, I freely admit, does nothing more
than reap that traditional "reward[] of high academic rank," "the
right to enunciate.., conventional wisdom." 398 I hope merely that
I have at least fulfilled the minimal responsibility of "expounding
399
the conventional wisdom at a properly sophisticated level."
Thanks to a rapidly maturing body of experience with
international arrangements such as the North American Free
Trade Agreement, the European Union, and the WTO, we now

understand that globalization fosters rather than hampers
multilateral efforts at environmental protection. 40 0 We are
witnessing the development of a federalism of federalisms, an ever

tighter web of economic and legal linkages across national
borders:
That humankind, in the aftermath of two world wars, has reached a
turning point in its history, that the world has entered a new era of
global interdependence, that all inhabitants of Planet Earth share a
common destiny, is a historical fact, a political fact, an economic fact, a
sociological fact, that has 40finally
penetrated the consciousness of most
1
of the earth's inhabitants.

"[M]ost of the earth's inhabitants," that is, except
globalization's most ardent antagonists. Their struggle, properly
viewed, is naked self-dealing on behalf of First World workers and
industries whose competitive strategy consists of mulcting at

home, exporting poverty, and claiming the mantle of economic
patriotism. How disgraceful. A postcolonial world dedicated to
development as a human right must combat the self-indulgent

politics of place. 40 2 Consumers, voters, citizens - unite. You have
40 3
a world to win.

KRUEGER, PERSPECTIVES ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 206-12 (1990).
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630 (2d ed. 1874).
398. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 12 (1958); see also Paul
A. Samuelson, Economists and the History of Ideas, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 18 (1962)
(noting that "liln the long run, the.., scholar works for the only coin worth having,"
the "applause" of his or her academic peers).
399. GALBRAITH, supra note 398, at 12.
400. See Richard H. Steinberg, Trade-Environment Negotiations in the EU,
NAFTA, and WTO: Regional Trajectories of Rule Development, 91 AM. J. INTL L. 231
(1997).
401. Harold J. Berman, World Law, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1617, 1621 (1995).
402. See, e.g., Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N. Doc.
AICONF.157/24, adopted at Vienna, June 14-25, 1993, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1661
(1993).
403. See Communist Manifesto, supra note 2, at 480.

